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MEDICINE AS A PUBLIC CALLING
Nicholas Bagley*
The debate over how to tame private medical spending tends to pit advocates
of government-provided insurance—a single-payer scheme—against those
who would prefer to harness market forces to hold down costs. When it is
mentioned at all, the possibility of regulating the medical industry as a public
utility is brusquely dismissed as anathema to the American regulatory tradi-
tion. This dismissiveness, however, rests on a failure to appreciate just how
deeply the public utility model shaped health law in the twentieth century—
and how it continues to shape health law today. Closer economic regulation of
the medical industry may or may not be prudent, but it is by no means in-
compatible with our governing institutions and political culture. Indeed, the
durability of such regulation suggests that the modern embrace of market-
based approaches in the medical industry may be more ephemeral than it
seems.
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Introduction
The debate over how to tame private medical spending tends to pit ad-
vocates of government-provided insurance—a single-payer scheme—against
those who would prefer to harness market forces to hold down costs. When
it is mentioned at all, the possibility of regulating the medical industry as a
public utility is usually dismissed as a political nonstarter.1 However com-
mon it may be in other countries, treating the health-care sector as a public
utility is thought to be anathema to American political traditions that valor-
ize patient choice and physician independence, treat hospitals as charities,
and are suspicious of state interference in economic affairs.2
Missing from this conventional account is the pivotal role that public
utility regulation has played in the development of the modern regulatory
state. Missing, too, is an appreciation of how extensively such regulation has
shaped health law—both for good and ill. Growing out of an ancient com-
mon law practice of imposing special obligations on innkeepers and com-
mon carriers, public utility regulation evolved during the Gilded Age and
the Progressive Era into a comprehensive challenge to the principles of lais-
sez-faire.3 Such regulation was originally justified—and insulated from con-
stitutional attack—by a developing body of law governing those private
businesses that were affected with a public interest. Such businesses could
not make unfettered use of their private property; instead, the law imposed
1. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the
Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 Health
Aff. 2125, 2130 (2011) (observing that talk of rate-setting may appear “highly controversial
and revolutionary”); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Health Care’s Road to Ruin, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,
2013, at SR1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/Sunday-review/health-cares-road-to-
ruin.html (stating that regulating medicine as a public utility “is not politically acceptable
here”); cf. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593, 1596–97 (2014) (noting the widespread assumption “that the chas-
tened, post-New Deal political era in which we live makes unlikely sufficient political support
for interventions that are not choice-preserving”).
2. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 24–29
(1982) (charting how physicians established their professional authority with the public and
used that authority in the twentieth century as “the ground for resistance to government”).
3. See Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire 161 (1998)
(“To the contemporary eye, wont to view the field as the province of bureaucrats and techni-
cally-minded economists, the progressive romance with public utilities . . . rate regulation may
be hard to fathom. . . . [But] it reflected the philosophical and political significance of public
utilities in [limiting] government control of business.”); William J. Novak, The Public Utility
Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in The Corporation and American
Democracy (Naomi Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, eds., forthcoming 2015) (“Quite simply,
public utility took over turn-of-the-century statute books, commission reports, and court
records. And it dominated the period’s legal output: legislative, administrative, as well as
judicial.”).
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“an affirmative obligation . . . to be reasonable in dealing with the public.”4
In an influential 1911 treatise, Bruce Wyman divided that affirmative obliga-
tion into four distinct duties: “that all must be served, adequate facilities
must be provided, reasonable rates must be charged, and no discriminations
must be made.”5
Businesses affected with a public interest were variously described as
public callings, public service corporations, and public utilities. They in-
cluded not only natural monopolies like railroads, ferries, telegraph lines,
electric plants, and water works, but also banks, insurance companies, hous-
ing interests, stockyards, and mines.6 Any industry that served an important
human need and had the market power to exploit consumers could plausibly
be characterized as a public utility. As J. Willard Hurst explained, “[t]he
public utility concept rests on recognition that some economic power is
wielded at key points of intersection of human relations” and that the law
must constrain the behavior of those “new forms of organized power, char-
acterized by great aggregations of capital and great capacity to affect life.”7
Prior to the Second World War, medicine was typically missing from
even the most capacious lists of industries affected with a public interest. Yet
that says more about the rudimentary state of medicine than it does about
the acceptability of regulating health care as a utility. The private hospital
industry was still in its infancy well into the Progressive Era, and hospitals
were only slowly shedding their traditional role as charity wards for the dy-
ing sick. By today’s standards, they remained technologically unsophisticated
and relatively cheap. For their part, physicians were independent profession-
als who sold personal services, not industrialists who put private property to
public use. The absence of proven therapies for most illnesses kept medical
expenditures in check, as did the competitive, even cutthroat, market for
physicians that prevailed in the early decades of the twentieth century.8
As Bruce Wyman observed, however, any given industry might fall in
and out of the legal category of public callings.9 And in the decades follow-
ing the Second World War, the meteoric growth of the medical industry
prompted the enactment of federal and state laws that bore the hallmarks of
public utility regulation. Collectively, these laws regulated market entry, im-
posed service obligations, prohibited certain forms of price discrimination,
4. Wolff Packing Co. v. Indus. Court, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923).
5. 1 Bruce Wyman, The Special Law Governing Public Service Corporations
and All Others Engaged in Public Employment, at xi (1911).
6. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (stockyards); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (housing interests); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389,
413–14 (1914) (insurance companies); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 113 (1911)
(banks); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (mines).
7. James Willard Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24
Okla. L. Rev. 224, 226 (1971).
8. See infra Section II.C.
9. 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at x (“What branches of industry will eventually be of such
public importance as to be included in the category . . . it would be rash to predict.”).
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and even fixed prices.10 In the last decades of the twentieth century, some of
this economic regulation gave way in the face of the resurgent belief that
market forces, not state control, ought to guide the distribution of health-
care services.11 But a durable strain of the law has always treated modern
medicine as a public calling—even today.
The fit is natural. Public utility regulation aims to address the sorts of
problems in market ordering—supply imbalances, access restrictions, and
abusive and discriminatory pricing—that have long afflicted the medical in-
dustry. Now that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has eased public concerns
about the uninsured, the serious economic challenges facing those with in-
surance are likely to become more salient. Should the ACA fail to remedy a
number of disturbing practices in the medical marketplace, policymakers
may find public utility regulation increasingly attractive. Indeed, nascent in-
terest in such regulation suggests that we may already be heading in that
direction.
The possibility of regulating medicine as a public utility has not passed
altogether unnoticed;12 indeed, talk of such regulation was common in the
1960s and 1970s.13 For at least three reasons, however, few recall how deeply
the public utility model once influenced medical regulation, and fewer still
appreciate how it continues to shape such regulation today.
First, the idea of public utility regulation seems stale.14 In part, this is a
legacy of the modern law-and-economics movement, which has subjected
public utility regulation to withering criticism.15 Deregulation of the airline
and trucking industries reinforced the idea that the public utility model,
outside a few narrow enclaves, ought to be abandoned.16 As Barbara Fried
explains, modern economists can find “no justification for expanding the
lessons of public utility regulation beyond public utilities and other formal
10. See infra Section III.A.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., Roger Colton et al., Lessons for the Health Care Industry from America’s
Experience with Public Utilities, 18 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 389 (1997); A.J.G. Priest, Possible
Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts in the Health Care Field, 35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 839
(1970). As some commentators have noted, the ACA in some respects regulates health insur-
ance—but not the health-care industry as a whole—as a public utility. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New
Source of Vulnerability, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 243, 262–63 (2012).
13. See Roger G. Noll, The Consequences of Public Utility Regulation of Hospitals, in Con-
trols on Health Care 25 (1975) (“[Since the mid-1960s], serious demands have been made
. . . to subject the industry to ‘public utility’ regulation.”).
14. See Novak, supra note 3 (“[F]or all intents and purposes, today, [the public utility
idea] has almost disappeared—erased from all but the most specialized historical memory.
What was once at the forefront of law, economics, and public policy discussion has been
relegated to the backbench—the dustbin—of American history.”).
15. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & Econ. 55 (1968); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); Richard A.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1969); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
16. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 197–239 (1982).
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or natural monopolies.”17 The ascendance of economics as a discipline—and
its particular influence in health policy—may have obscured the influence of
the public utility model on health law.18
Second, the law of public callings is often thought to do little more than
impose a duty on certain businesses to serve all paying customers. In
medicine, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) res-
onates with that service duty, as do several antidiscrimination laws with par-
ticular significance for health care, mainly Title VI and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. But the law of public callings has traditionally involved
much more, including the regulation of market entry and the prices charged
for services. This sort of extensive economic regulation was a conspicuous
feature of health law in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Yet a
narrow conception of the duties owed by businesses affected with a public
interest misses the link between such regulation and the law of public
callings.
Third, questions about insurance coverage have properly consumed the
political and academic discourse around health care. Public debate has thus
centered on how, if at all, the state should redistribute resources to guarantee
insurance to those who might otherwise go without. The sustained focus on
the uninsured has drawn attention away from a persistent, ongoing practice
of using state power to curb unfair and oppressive practices in the medical
marketplace.
This Article aims to recover that neglected tradition of public utility
regulation. My claim is not that medicine was once treated as a pure public
utility; it was not. My claim, instead, is that laws bearing the characteristic
features of public utility regulation became prominent in the decades follow-
ing the Second World War. Many of those laws remain on the books today.
If the American state embraced a public utility model for medicine in the
recent past, such an approach would seem to be compatible with our gov-
erning institutions and political culture. And the durability of the tradi-
tion—the fact that it stretches back more than a century—suggests that the
current embrace of market-based approaches in health care may be more
ephemeral than it seems. Indeed, as I explain, the pendulum may already be
swinging back toward public utility regulation.
Whether treating medicine more like a public utility would count as an
improvement is genuinely hard to say. Any effort to closely regulate a large,
complex, and rapidly changing industry would be fraught with difficulties.
Economic regulation might well create more problems than it would solve.
But, absent concrete evidence of the ineffectiveness of such regulation, I see
no reason to dismiss it out of hand. Most other countries treat health care as
a public utility—albeit as a publicly funded, not privately financed, utility.
17. Fried, supra note 3, at 201.
18. See Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Nowhere 156 (1997) (“In the health policy
community, the most influential ideas have been associated with economists. For nearly two
decades, the neoclassical critique . . . has enjoyed a privileged position within health policy
circles.”).
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They typically spend far less for care that, along many dimensions, appears
superior to ours.19 And it is not obvious that health-care markets—which
suffer from well-understood failings associated with market concentration,
informational asymmetries, and moral hazard—would outperform a rate-
setting body that, say, used Medicare’s payment system as a model.20
So I do mean to give the pendulum a gentle push. Commentators seem
defensive, almost embarrassed, to raise the possibility of regulating medicine
as a utility. Maybe they fear being tarred as insensitive to the risks of eco-
nomic regulation, unsophisticated about the market, and ignorant of the
American regulatory tradition. They need not be so defensive. Public utility
regulation is every bit as much a part of that tradition as laissez-faire. And if
the market-oriented approaches that are ascendant today prove unsatisfac-
tory, public utility regulation is an option worth exploring. It may not be the
answer, but the debate between market-oriented and regulatory approaches
should unapologetically examine the virtues and vices of both.
A word about the boundaries of the project. Public utility regulation
entails government restrictions on a private business’s use of its property.
But the state can also adjust business conduct through the use of its purchas-
ing power, and the line between (mandatory) direct regulation and (volun-
tary) spending conditions is not always sharp. Medicare, for example, fixes
the rate that providers can bill the federal government for providing services
to beneficiaries. Because few providers can afford not to participate in Medi-
care, the program’s rate schedules resemble public utility regulation for the
beneficiary population. Yet the economic conditions associated with public
insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid are typically limited to that
population. (A few important exceptions are discussed below.21) My concern
here is with the economic regulation of the relationships between privately
insured patients and the institutions and individuals that care for them.
I. Health Care: Where Do We Go from Here?
The ACA marks a watershed in its extension of health coverage to tens
of millions of the uninsured. By no means, however, has it remedied other
flaws in the private health-care system. After the ACA, attention is likely to
19. See Nat’l Research Council & Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., U.S. Health
in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health 1 (Steven H. Woolf &
Laudan Aron eds., 2013), http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2013/US-Health-in-International-Per
spective-Shorter-Lives-Poorer-Health.aspx (“Americans live shorter lives and experience more
injuries and illnesses than people in other high-income countries.”); Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev., Health at a Glance 2013, at 154 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/health/
health-systems/health-at-a-glance.htm (reporting that per capita health-care spending in the
United States is “two-and-a-half times the average of all OECD countries” and “around twice
as much” as France and Germany).
20. See Joseph White, Competing Solutions 278 (1995) (“Within the international
standard, costs are controlled by setting fees, making budgets, and imposing controls on in-
vestment, not by competition.”).
21. See infra Section III.B (discussing Hill-Burton, the charitable tax exemption, and
EMTALA).
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shift to the challenges that even the insured will face in a market plagued by
a number of well-understood failings. Should these challenges prove acute,
they could feed the perception that private hospitals, physicians, and other
providers wield inordinate power in the market—power that federal and
state governments may come under pressure to curtail.
A. Supply
Because those with insurance use more medical services than those
without,22 the existing medical infrastructure could buckle under the weight
of increased demand associated with the ACA’s insurance expansion. Policy-
makers’ greatest immediate concern is a coming “doc shortage,” especially a
shortage of primary-care physicians, who were in short supply even before
the ACA’s enactment.23 Recent estimates suggest that the nation will need at
least 40,000 new primary care physicians over the next decade to meet rising
demand.24 Especially severe shortages are expected in rural areas and inner
cities.25
The nation’s shrinking capacity to provide universal primary care has
given rise to acute access concerns. Close observers of physician supply note
that “[i]t can be debated whether the current primary care practitioner-to-
population ratio is adequate, but two things are unquestioned: Adult pa-
tients are having difficulty gaining timely access to primary care, and a seri-
ous shortage of primary care practitioners is inevitable in the near future.”26
Especially in rural and poor urban areas, frustration could mount over the
inadequate supply and inappropriate distribution of primary-care
practitioners.
B. Access
In an effort to keep their premiums low, most health plans restrict, to
some extent, the providers they accept into their coverage networks. Price
competition has spurred insurers on the new exchanges to constrain their
22. See Thomas C. Buchmueller et al., The Effect of Health Insurance on Medical Care
Utilization and Implications for Insurance Expansion: A Review of the Literature, 62 Med. Care
Res. & Rev. 3, 20 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Adam N. Hofer et al., Expansion of Coverage Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and Primary Care Utilization, 89 Milbank Q. 69, 84 (2011); Elbert S.
Huang & Kenneth Finegold, Seven Million Americans Live in Areas Where Demand for Primary
Care May Exceed Supply by More than 10 Percent, 32 Health Aff. 614, 614 (2013).
24. Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Mark D. Smith, Primary Care: Proposed Solutions to the
Physician Shortage Without Training More Physicians, 32 Health Aff. 1881, 1881 (2013). But
see Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Graduate Medical Education That Meets the
Nation’s Health Needs 7–8 (2014), http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2014/Graduate-Medical-
Education-That-Meets-the-Nations-Health-Needs.aspx (concluding that fears of a physician
shortage may be overblown).
25. See Thomas Bodenheimer & Hoangmai H. Pham, Primary Care: Current Problems
and Proposed Solutions, 29 Health Aff. 799, 802 (2010).
26. Id. at 801.
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provider networks more assertively than in the past.27 A McKinsey report
optimistically suggests that “[t]his trend is consistent with what we see in
most well-functioning consumer markets ranging from cell phone plans to
automobiles—a variety of choices comprising different value propositions at
different price points.”28
Not everyone views the trend with such equanimity. In many transac-
tions, as Margaret Radin emphasizes, “[t]here is an irreducibly nonmarket
or nonmonetized aspect of human interaction going on between seller and
recipient, even though a sale is taking place at the same time.”29 Many peo-
ple find it hard to square the caregiving relationship at the heart of medicine
with the notion that prestigious hospitals and popular physicians might re-
fuse their insurance. The effect even has a name—“doc shock”—and narrow
networks have triggered fears that only the wealthy, who can afford to
purchase gold-plated plans, will have access to the finest medical care, while
everyone else will have to make do with second- and third-rate providers.30
The concerns are often misplaced—more expensive hospitals typically don’t
provide higher-quality care31—and many people are comfortable with the
trade-offs that come with purchasing cheaper health plans. But many others
resent the implication that access to high-quality health care turns on who
pays more.
C. Discriminatory Prices
Over the past two years, a number of widely circulated articles have
exposed enormous and hard-to-justify price variations in the health-care
system.32 Story after story has highlighted what health-policy experts have
long understood: that the uninsured pay higher prices for medical services
than the insured; that prices for medical services vary dramatically from
27. See David H. Howard, Adverse Effects of Prohibiting Narrow Provider Networks, 371
New Eng. J. Med. 591, 591 (2014) (“[A]bout 40% of plan networks were classified as ‘ul-
tranarrow’ or ‘narrow,’ meaning that they contracted with less than 30% or 70%, respectively,
of the hospitals in the plan rating area.”).
28. McKinsey Ctr. for U.S. Health Sys. Reform, Hospital Networks: Configura-




29. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 107 (1996).
30. See Lori Gottlieb, Op-Ed., Daring to Complain About Obamacare, N.Y. Times, Nov.
11, 2013, at A25, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/opinion/daring-to-complain-about-
obamacare.html?_r=2& (describing people’s frustration at being “mandated to buy expensive
exchange or private policies without access to their current doctors”).
31. See Chapin White et al., Understanding Differences Between High- and Low-Price Hos-
pitals: Implications for Efforts to Rein in Costs, 33 Health Aff. 324, 329 (2014).
32. For two of the most prominent exposés, see Steven Brill, Special Report, Bitter Pill:
How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care, Time, Mar. 4,
2013, at 16; Elisabeth Rosenthal, As Hospital Prices Soar, a Stitch Tops $500, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/health/as-hospital-costs-soar-single-stitch-
tops-500.html.
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hospital to hospital, even in the same geographic region; and that the prices
charged bear no apparent relationship to underlying costs. Responding to
interest in the issue, Medicare—for the first time—released data in 2013
documenting extraordinary variations in the costs that hospitals claimed
they incurred for treating a range of conditions.33 Encouraged by the posi-
tive response, Medicare followed up in 2014 with the public release of com-
prehensive billing data for each of its 880,000 participating physicians.34
Because discriminatory pricing is most apparent in the prices that hos-
pitals charge the uninsured, concerns about variable prices may become less
urgent as the ranks of the uninsured dwindle. The ACA, however, leaves
intact a different source of “unfair” price variation: variations in prices for
exchange plans that can’t be explained with reference to variable demand for
medical services. The premiums for exchange plans in Wisconsin are sub-
stantially higher—in some areas, almost twice as high—as premiums in
neighboring Minnesota.35 And while a standard “silver” plan for a family of
four in Nashville, Tennessee cost $6,708 in 2014, the same plan in Jackson,
Mississippi—one state over—ran $14,592.36 Because silver plans are de-
signed to cover only 70 percent of a family’s average health-care expenses,
the average Jackson family will also spend an additional $6,253 out of
pocket, more than twice as much as an average Nashville family.37 These
disparities, which appear to be driven primarily by differences in provider
market power, have already begun to stoke claims of unfairness arising from
the happenstance of geography.38
D. Costs
All of these concerns—with supply, access, and discriminatory pric-
ing—are likely to pale in comparison to the frustration that could attend the
continued escalation of prices for medical care. In rejecting a single-payer
model for paying for medical services, the ACA pinned frontline responsibil-
ity for controlling private medical spending on private health plans. The
exchanges are a key feature of this strategy. By facilitating cost-conscious
33. Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Re
ports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
34. See Jonathan Blum, Next Steps in Medicare Data Transparency, CMS Blog (Apr. 2,
2014), http://blog.cms.gov/?s=next§teps+in+data+transparency.
35. Christopher Snowbeck & MaryJo Webster, On Health Exchanges, Rates Swing at Bor-
der: Western Wisconsin Rates Almost Twice Those in Twin Cities, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Nov.
3, 2013, at A1, http://www.twincities.com/politics/ci_24437197/health-exchanges-rates-swing-
at-border (examining unpublished data from the Kaiser Family Foundation).
36. See Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation Office of Health Policy, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., ASPE Issue Brief 10 (2013), http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/marketplace_premiums_ib_final.pdf.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Jordan Rau, In Southwest Georgia, the Affordable Care Act Is Having Trouble
Living up to Its Name, Kaiser Health News (Feb. 3, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/
Georgia-insurance-costs-obamacare.
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shopping in the individual and small-group markets, the exchanges sharpen
insurers’ incentives to negotiate low prices with providers.
Although managed care organizations have been at the center of health
policy for the past quarter-century,39 their track record is not encouraging.
The rise of managed care in the 1990s appeared to reduce cost growth for a
brief period, but medical inflation resumed its inexorable rate of increase by
the early 2000s.40 Cost growth in the private market has generally outpaced
cost growth in Medicare, and that divergence has accelerated over the past
decade.41
Managed care organizations face a number of challenges when it comes
to restraining medical spending. Direct oversight of provider behavior is
devilishly hard.42 Financial incentives are blunt tools to encourage hospitals
and physicians to provide low-cost, high-quality care.43 And public resis-
tance to cost-management techniques can be fierce.44
Of greatest significance, dominant providers’ market power can enable
abusive pricing practices and impede insurers’ efforts to drive down costs.45
In markets where managed care organizations cannot credibly threaten to
exclude high-cost providers from their coverage networks—if, for example,
exclusion of a prominent local hospital would make a plan unmarketable—
the providers can name their price. And concentration in the health-care
sector is pervasive. Deploying a widely used economic metric, David Cutler
and Fiona Scott Morton recently showed that roughly half of all hospital
markets are highly concentrated and another third are moderately concen-
trated.46 The extent of concentration has increased sharply since the 1980s,
and the trend is accelerating.47 More and more hospitals are transforming
themselves into integrated medical systems with close links to physician
39. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s,
320 New Eng. J. Med. 29 (1989) (laying out the principles of managed competition).
40. See National Health Expenditure Tables, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
tbl.13, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Re
ports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf (last modified May 5, 2014).
41. See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers:
Growth Rates in Spending over Three Decades, Health Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 230, 232–33;
Per Enrollee Growth in Medicare Spending and Private Health Insurance Premiums (for Common
Benefits), 1970-2012, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://kff.org/health-
costs/slide/per-enrollee-growth-in-medicare-spending-and-private-health-insurance-premi
ums-for-common-benefits-1970-2012/.
42. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2627 (2001).
43. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and how to
Fix It, in The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care 1, 7–10 (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010).
44. See Robinson, supra note 42, at 2623.
45. See Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So
Different from Other Countries, Health Aff., May–June 2003, at 89; David M. Cutler & Fiona
Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 JAMA 1964, 1969 (2013).
46. See Cutler & Morton, supra note 45, at 1966.
47. See id.; Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, New Laws and Rising Costs Create a Surge of
Supersizing Hospitals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 2013, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/
business/bigger-hospitals-may-lead-to-bigger-bills-for-patients.html.
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practices.48 In one of the more startling changes over the past decade, hospi-
tals have purchased physician practices at a furious rate.49 By 2011, for the
first time, hospitals owned half of all physician practices.50
The ACA may be partly responsible. One of the notorious failings of the
American health-care system is its fragmentation—the inability of disparate
physicians, hospitals, and other providers to coordinate the care they offer to
patients, especially the chronically ill.51 To address this challenge, the ACA
uses Medicare reform to spur the development of integrated medical sys-
tems.52 Most prominently, the ACA encourages the creation of accountable
care organizations (ACOs), which can share in any savings they generate for
Medicare if they hit certain quality targets and reduce spending for a target
population.53
Laudable as that effort is, it is at loggerheads with the ACA’s attempt to
use managed care to reduce medical inflation. As Katherine Baicker and
Helen Levy note, attempts to defragment the health-care sector to improve
care coordination can contribute to anticompetitive consolidation.54 Recent
empirical work confirms the point.55 Although the antitrust agencies have
issued policies that aim to discourage such consolidation,56 few observers
expect antitrust enforcement to much diminish provider concentration.57
48. See Lawton Robert Burns & Ralph W. Muller, Hospital-Physician Collaboration:
Landscape of Economic Integration and Impact on Clinical Integration, 86 Milbank Q. 375
(2008).
49. See Manoj Jain, Hospitals Buy Private Practices, and a Medical Tradition Fades, Wash.
Post, Mar. 13, 2012, at E1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/doctors-
in-private-practices-are-now-joining-hospital-staffs/2012/02/14/gIQAEFz07R_story.html.
50. See Cutler & Morton, supra note 45, at 1966 (“From 2004 to 2011, hospital owner-
ship of physician practices increased from 24% of practices to 49%.”).
51. See generally The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care, supra note 43.
52. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101
Geo. L.J. 519, 569 (2013).
53. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat.
119, 395 (2010). For a more comprehensive list of the ACA’s various efforts to promote greater
coordination, see Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, Coordination Versus Competition in Health
Care Reform, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 789, 790 (2013).
54. Baicker & Levy, supra note 53, at 789.
55. See, e.g., Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
The Synthesis Project, Policy Brief No. 9, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation-
Update (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261;
Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is Asso-
ciated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 Health Aff. 756 (2014); Austin B. Frakt et al.,
Plan-Provider Integration, Premiums, and Quality in the Medicare Advantage Market, 48
Health Services Res. 1996 (2013).
56. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organi-
zations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Problem, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28,
2011).
57. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in
Health Care, 89 Or. L. Rev. 847, 868–76 (2011) (discussing the failure of antitrust enforce-
ment to prevent consolidation in the health-care sector and raising concerns about ACOs).
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As a result, dominant hospital systems in some markets may come to
resemble the natural monopolies that have traditionally been regulated as
public utilities. Should those systems exploit their market power, rising in-
surance premiums would cut into wages and could raise the cost of ex-
change plans to unaffordable levels. Tax credits for exchange plans will
provide only partial relief. Through 2018, the tax credits will rise to cover
any increase in exchange premiums.58 After that, however, the credits will
grow only at the rate of inflation, shifting the costs of growing premiums to
individuals and families.59
The meteoric growth of high-deductible health plans could exacerbate
cost concerns. In 2006, just one out of ten employees received employer-
sponsored coverage with a deductible that exceeded $1,000 per year. That’s
for individual coverage; deductibles for family coverage are higher.60 By
2013—just seven years later—almost four in ten exceeded $1,000 per year.61
At small firms today, one in three employees has a deductible in excess of
$2,000 per year.62 Many exchange plans will have similarly high deduct-
ibles.63 Caps on out-of-pocket expenses—set at $6,350 for individuals and
$12,700 for families—will somewhat limit financial exposure,64 but many
people are already experiencing sticker shock at the medical bills that insur-
ance doesn’t cover.65
The proliferation of high-deductible plans means that millions of in-
sured families and individuals could, when they encounter health problems,
find themselves in a precarious financial situation.66 Although the ACA will
allow many families to avoid bankruptcy, it by no means fully protects them
against the financial shocks associated with health care.
58. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
59. See id.; see also John E. McDonough, Inside National Health Reform 300–01
(2011) (noting that premiums could increase as much as 10 percent per year).
60. Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research & Educational Trust, Em-
ployer Health Benefits: 2013 Annual Survey 110 (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-20132.pdf.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 111.
63. See Leslie Scism & Timothy W. Martin, Deductibles Fuel New Worries of Health-Law
Sticker Shock, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at A1, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
02303330204579246211560398876.
64. See Robert Pear, A Limit on Consumer Costs Is Delayed in Health Care Law, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/a-limit-on-consumer-
costs-is-delayed-in-health-care-law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
65. See Peter Frost, Obamacare Deductibles May Cause Sticker Shock, Chi. Trib., Oct. 13,
2013, at 1.1, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-13/business/ct-biz-1013-obamacare-
deductibles-20131013_1_health-care-overhaul-health-insurance-health-coverage.
66. See McDonough, supra note 59, at 300 (“The Massachusetts experience with a simi-
lar structure shows that most consumers choose lower-premium options, leaving them vulner-
able to high cost sharing in the event of a serious illness.”).
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* * *
The problems sketched out here—supply shortages, access restrictions,
and capricious, exorbitant prices—are specific manifestations of deep
problems in the health-care market. Prices for health care are rarely dis-
cussed openly, and comparison shopping is almost unheard of.67 Informa-
tional asymmetries make consumers unusually dependent on third parties—
mainly physicians—in making health-care decisions.68 Scientific evidence
about the medical benefits of conventional therapies is often so sparse that
it’s hard to make good cost-quality tradeoffs.69 Physicians and hospitals can
stimulate demand for their own services and often have financial incentives
to do so.70 And the prevalence of insurance enables excessive consumption
because patients are shielded from the full costs of care.71
Nonetheless, persistent problems with supply, access, and prices could
stoke dissatisfaction with a market-based approach to organizing the private
health-care sector. It’s impossible to predict the depth of such dissatisfac-
tion; indeed, the ACA could provoke systemic changes that mitigate much of
it. If not, however, pressure will build for a government response.
What might such a response look like? Some critics on the right hope to
jettison the ACA and its effort to achieve near-universal coverage in favor of
a purer embrace of the market.72 As they see it, a slew of well-intentioned
but poorly designed state interventions have exacerbated the health-care
market’s failings. For them, the ACA is the apotheosis of this sort of needless
government meddling, its nominal embrace of managed competition belied
by regulatory restrictions that will impede the very competition the ACA
was supposed to enable. Only by ditching the ACA—and sweeping other
needless laws off the books—can the promise of the market be realized.
Strictly as a matter of practical politics, however, the ACA’s abandon-
ment looks increasingly unlikely. Millions of people have already signed up
for exchange plans; millions more are now enrolled in Medicaid. Returning
to a pre-ACA status quo in which they would lose that coverage, and insur-
ers would lose their business, is close to a political nonstarter.73 To be sure,
67. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 643, 653–59 (2008).
68. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am.
Econ. Rev. 941, 965–66 (1963).
69. See Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Identifying Health Technologies
That Work: Searching for Evidence 21 (1994) (estimating that at least 80 percent of
widely used medical interventions lack rigorous research documenting their efficacy).
70. See Henry J. Aaron, Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America’s
Health Care 13–17 (1991).
71. See id. at 10–13.
72. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of
Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 493 (2013).
73. See Henry J. Aaron, Here to Stay—Beyond the Rough Launch of the ACA, 370 New
Eng. J. Med. 2257, 2258 (2014) (“Although some opponents continue to call for repeal of the
ACA, the law is here to stay.”). But see David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public
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the ACA could be adjusted in a more market-friendly direction by relaxing
certain regulations that limit the range of plans that can legally be sold.74 But
the ACA’s core is likely to remain intact, and modest changes are unlikely to
resolve the market failings that might spur interest in alternatives to man-
aged competition.
From the political left, the leading reform alternative is the adoption of a
single-payer scheme—Medicare for All. But moving to single payer is, if any-
thing, even less likely than the abandonment of the ACA. Many of those
with employer-sponsored coverage—almost 150 million people—would re-
sist surrendering it in favor of a government-run plan.75 And insurers, in-
cluding the exchange insurers, would lobby fiercely against any move that
would put them out of business.76
Public utility regulation offers a less disruptive alternative, one that re-
tains the basic architecture of the private financing system while asserting
state control over the medical industry’s perceived excesses.77 That such reg-
ulation would obviate the need for socialized insurance is no coincidence:
public utility regulation has long been understood to preserve a role for the
private while attending to the needs of the public.78 As Wyman explained,
“[t]his principle of State control does not lead one to socialism; indeed, it
saves one from socialism if truly understood.”79 Here, Wyman was echoing
Henry Carter Adams’s claim a generation earlier that economic regulation
“stands opposed to anarchy on the one hand, which is individualism gone to
seed; and to socialism on the other, which, both historically and logically, is
a revolt against the superficial claims and pernicious consequences of laissez-
faire.”80
Law: Health Care Reform and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 873, 897–901 (2014)
(arguing that the ACA is more vulnerable than its supporters appreciate).
74. See Joseph R. Antos, Health Care Reform After the ACA, 370 New Eng. J. Med. 2259,
2261 (2014).
75. See Hacker, supra note 18, at 148 (“Support for the [Clinton health-care] proposal
waned . . . because of a general fear among Americans that the proposal would make them
worse off.”); Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found. (2013), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/.
76. Cf. Hacker, supra note 18, at 177 (“[I]t is extremely unlikely that [a single-payer]
plan would have garnered strong enough support to overcome the frenetic opposition it would
have provoked.”); McDonough, supra note 59, at 47 (“Single-payer advocates, passionately as
they believed in their cause, were unable to convince even sympathetic lawmakers that there
was a way to get a Medicare for All bill to the president’s desk.”).
77. Cf. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 389, 397
(2009) (“[Health-care reformers] should look for potential evolutionary pathways that launch
from present-day institutional arrangements and incentives.”).
78. See Fried, supra note 3, at 164 (“Indeed, progressive commentators routinely sug-
gested, regulation might be the best friend capitalism had, given that public regulation of
private property was the only remaining viable alternative to outright public ownership.”).
79. 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at viii.
80. Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, in Two Essays by
Henry Carter Adams 57, 125 (Joseph Dorfman ed., 1969).
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II. The American Tradition of Public Utility Regulation
The modern reluctance to entertain the possibility of regulating
medicine as a public utility doesn’t arise from clear evidence that it can’t
work. International experience suggests that it can.81 The reluctance seems to
stem, instead, from the persistent sense that, in the United States, public
utility regulation is adopted rarely and only as a last resort. Apart from occa-
sional and regrettable excesses, typified by the regulation of the airline and
trucking industries, public utility regulation, the story goes, has properly
been confined to the regulation of natural monopolies. Because medicine—
a fragmented industry comprising hospitals, physicians, and a dizzying array
of other providers—is not a true natural monopoly, treating it as a public
utility is out of step with historical practice and presumptively inappropri-
ate. Maybe other countries treat medicine as a utility, but it’s not how we do
things here.
But in fact we do. The dominant account reflects a certain historical
blindness about the pivotal role that public utility regulation has played in
the American state. In the decades following the Civil War, the economic
regulation of public callings became both common and intrusive. By the
Progressive Era, such regulation covered an extraordinary array of indus-
tries—not just natural monopolies. What linked those industries together,
and what made state intervention both necessary and consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment, was the perception that they wielded undue mar-
ket power over goods or services upon which the public had grown
dependent.
The dominant account also overlooks how extensively public utility reg-
ulation has shaped health law. As medicine became technologically more
sophisticated and acquired substantial market power in the decades after the
Second World War, policymakers began drawing on the public utility model
in earnest. And no wonder. Public utility regulation was developed precisely
to address the concerns with supply, access, discrimination, and unfair pric-
ing that had begun to plague the modern medical industry.
A. The Rise of Public Utility Regulation
During the Gilded Age, the rapid advance of railroads, the rise of indus-
trial production, and improvements in international trade fueled explosive
growth.82 These developments also stirred resentment, at first from farmers
who, subject to the fluctuations of the international markets and the caprice
of the railroad magnates, felt caught in a vise.83 In the 1870s, agrarian inter-
ests in the Midwest pressed for the adoption of what became known as the
81. See White, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that other industrialized nations control
medicine “through systems of regulation” that include “fee schedules or budgeting—usually
both” and “limits [on] capital investment for the largest part of hospital care”).
82. See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877–1920, at 46 (1967).
83. See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 51–52 (1955).
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Granger laws, which fixed prices for the railroads and grain warehouses that
farmers depended on to market their goods.
But were the new laws constitutional? The ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, together with the growing prominence of laissez-faire ideas in
economic and legal thought, had raised anew the question of how far, and
under what circumstances, the states could intrude on the rights to private
property and liberty of contract.84 Even the most committed adherents to
laissez-faire recognized that the Due Process Clause posed no general im-
pediment to the regulation, through the police power, of public health,
safety, and morals.85 Less clear was whether the Due Process Clause con-
strained states’ ability to oversee the fairness of private business transactions.
As Ernst Freund explained in 1914, economic interests “obviously do not
affect the public welfare as urgently as safety, morals and order. With regard
to many conceivable phases of industrial regulation, the legitimacy of the
police power is seriously disputed.”86
The Granger laws came before the Supreme Court in 1877. In Munn v.
Illinois and its companion cases, the Court seemed to accept the principle
that the states lacked plenary power to regulate the affairs of purely private
businesses.87 But the Court rejected the claim that all private businesses had
a constitutional right to conduct their business relations as they saw fit. The
Court reasoned that some businesses were “affected with a public interest”
and, as such, were the appropriate targets of economic regulation.88
As refashioned by the Supreme Court, the concept of businesses “af-
fected with a public interest” had a source in two bodies of law. The first was
the common law, which from time immemorial had imposed special duties
on certain callings—most notably, innkeepers and common carriers.89 (In-
terestingly, ancient English common law appears to have treated the practice
of medicine as a public calling.90) Those duties included, among other
things, accepting all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis and offering rea-
sonable rates.91
84. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, 1 Princeton
Rev. 233 (1878) (considering the question).
85. See Fried, supra note 3, at 20.
86. Ernst Freund, Police Power, in 2 Cyclopedia of American Government 706,
707–08 (Andrew C. McLaughlin & Albert Bushnell Hart eds., 1914).
87. See 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
88. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
89. See, e.g., Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., The Law of Innkeepers and Hotels, Includ-
ing Other Public Houses, Theatres, Sleeping Cars (1906).
90. 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at 7 (“From other cases it is plain that the curing of man or
beast was considered a public calling.”).
91. Id. at 16 (“To compel the proprietors of those businesses which had been regarded as
peculiarly affected with a public interest to serve all that applied at reasonable rates was imme-
morial practice and therefore was indisputably due process of law.”).
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Corporate charters provided the second source for the idea that some
businesses owed special duties to the public. Before the Civil War, corpora-
tions by and large were individually chartered under state law.92 Those busi-
ness-specific charters often included detailed conditions on the businesses
receiving them.93 Although the gradual shift to general charters of incorpo-
ration eventually did away with charter conditions,94 the idea persisted that
the state could properly oversee the conduct of private corporations carrying
out public business.
Munn’s apparent endorsement of the principle that the Constitution
prohibited the economic regulation of a purely private business has led
many to read it as a step on the road to Lochner.95 As William Novak has
recently shown, however, the opposite is closer to the truth: Munn inaugu-
rated an era of muscular economic regulation of private businesses deemed
to be affected with a public interest.96 The public utility idea was expansive,
not restrictive, and the agrarian populists who succeeded the Grange agi-
tated, with some success, for legislation aimed at the “money power.”97 In
particular, the regulation of railroads and grain elevators became ubiqui-
tous, first at the state level98 and then at the federal level with the 1887
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act.99
More generally, the populists’ distrust of private power found expres-
sion in the common law. By 1900, the industries that the courts deemed to
be “affected with a public interest” included banking, insurance, railroads,
telephone, telegraph, electric power, natural gas, water, urban transporta-
tion, heating, interurban electric, motor bus and truck, airways, radio, pipe
lines, warehouses, stockyards, ice plants, milk, fuel, and meatpacking.100
Even as the populist movement sputtered out in the mid-1890s, a new
generation of progressive reformers came to the fore. Centered in the cities,
supported by the rising middle class, and optimistic about expert govern-
ance, the progressives shared an intense distrust of private power with the
92. See James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in
the Law of the United States 1780–1970, at 13–18 (1970).
93. See Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional
Rights 19 (1904) (“[T]he state may grant the required permit or license upon such conditions
as it pleases.”); Cooley, supra note 84, at 233 (“Wherever the business is a privilege, and the
taking out of a license is required, the state may impose conditions upon the privilege.”).
94. See Novak, supra note 3.
95. See id. (collecting sources).
96. Id.
97. See generally George H. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (1971).
98. See Novak, supra note 3.
99. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
100. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 93, at 381 (cataloging such industries); 1 Wyman, supra
note 5, at xi (describing characteristics of such industries); Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of
the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 514, 515 (1911) (same).
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populists.101 Yet, as historian Robert Wiebe explains, “[w]here their prede-
cessors would have destroyed many of urban-industrial America’s outstand-
ing characteristics, the new reformers wanted to adapt an existing order to
their own ends.”102
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the progressives called for
the creation of regulatory bodies that could better control public utilities.103
“The human interests and legal rights protected remain the same,” John
Dickinson explained, “but the old legal procedure has been superseded by
direct governmental action on the plea of prevention, or greater speed and
effectiveness of the remedy.”104 Starting with Wisconsin and New York in
1907, the states moved almost without exception to establish public service
commissions.105 The new commissions oversaw a vast range of industries,
including
steam railroads, electric and street railways, interurban or suburban rail-
ways, elevated railroads or subways, automobile railroads, steamboats and
other water craft, express lines and messenger lines, signalling facilities,
bridges and ferries connected with railroads, pipe lines for the transporta-
tion of oil or water, sleeping, parlor and drawing-room cars, terminals,
union depots, docks, wharves, storage elevators, fast freight lines, stage
lines, messenger companies, telegraph and telephone companies, facilities
for the manufacture and sale of gas or electricity, heat, light, water, power,
hot or cold air or steam, and irrigation and sewage facilities.106
By 1916, Frank Goodnow, one of the fathers of American administrative
law, could note the significance of the “change of ideas” when it came to the
regulation of public utilities:
Not only is no constitutional question any more raised as to the power of
the competent organ of our government to take the necessary regulatory
measures but public opinion justifies regulation of so drastic a character
that it would hardly have been deemed possible even a quarter of a century
ago.107
101. See Hofstadter, supra note 83, at 313 (arguing that progressive regulation reflected
“the purpose of eliminating that private power to tax which is the prerogative of monopoly”).
102. Wiebe, supra note 82, at 165.
103. See G. Lloyd Wilson et al., Public Utility Regulation 15–20 (1938).
104. John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the
United States 7 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1959) (1927); see also Wiebe, supra note 82, at 166
(“The heart of progressivism was the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny
through bureaucratic means.”).
105. Fried, supra note 3, at 161.
106. I. Leo Sharfman, Commission Regulation of Public Utilities: A Survey of Legislation, 53
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1, 8–9 (1914); see also G.H. Robinson, Cases and Au-
thorities on Public Utilities 77–78 (2d ed. 1935) (offering a similarly expansive list).
107. Frank Johnson Goodnow, The American Conception of Liberty and Govern-
ment 28–29 (1916); see also Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 31
(1930) (“Suffice it to say that through [modern government’s] regulation of those tremendous
human and financial interests which we call public utilities, the government may in large
measure determine the whole social-economic direction of the future.”); Dexter Merriam
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B. The Attributes of Public Callings
What made a business a public calling? Or, to put it another way, when
was it appropriate for the state to subject an industry to public utility regula-
tion? Because constitutional objections to such regulation dropped away
only when the business was deemed “affected with a public interest,” judicial
doctrine played an unusually prominent role in shaping the policy debate.108
The courts, however, were not very clear about the attributes of public call-
ings.109 As Felix Frankfurter and Henry Hart noted, “the futile efforts at
dogmatic statement of doctrine cover a clash of opinion on a far reaching
issue; namely, to what degree free competition is so complete a protection to
the public interest as to render arbitrary any governmental departure from
it.”110
Nonetheless, legislatures and courts had, by the early decades of the
twentieth century, reached a workable consensus about which businesses
were affected with a public interest.111 That consensus was oriented around
two basic considerations: first, that the business in question met an impor-
tant human need; and second, that some feature of the relevant market
presented the risk of oppression.112 When these conditions were satisfied, it
was both appropriate as a policy matter and fully constitutional to require
Keezer, Some Questions Involved in the Application of the “Public Interest” Doctrine, 25 Mich. L.
Rev. 596, 596 (1927) (“[A]pplication of the [affected with a public interest] doctrine has been
steadily expanded, bringing within its scope an increasing range and diversity of enter-
prises. . . . [that] will continue to be enlarged.”).
108. See Robinson, supra note 106, at 5 (“[T]he legislature speaks and the court also
speaks, and because the selection [of public businesses] is conceived of as a matter of ‘due
process of law’ . . . the apparatus [for selecting] is a combination of legislature-court-state-
and-federal elements.”).
109. See Freund, supra note 93, at 382; Fried, supra note 3, at 169 (“[T]he Court invoked
a dizzying array of tests to determine whether a business was affected with a public
interest . . . .”).
110. Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in 13 Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences 104, 106 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1934). Indeed, not
everyone was convinced that the Fourteenth Amendment had anything to say about the con-
stitutionality of the economic regulation of private business. See Edward A. Adler, Business
Jurisprudence, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 158 (1915); Burdick, supra note 100, at 516.
111. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 50 (1998) (“Marginal dis-
agreements concerning the precise location of the boundary between public and private enter-
prise persisted. There was, however, a broad measure of agreement concerning where the
division lay.”).
112. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538 (1923) (“In
nearly all the businesses [that are affected with a public interest], the thing which gave the
public interest was the indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and
arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected without regulation.”); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“The space in Washington is necessarily monopolized in compara-
tively few hands, and letting portions of it is as much a business as any other. Housing is a
necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control
are present.”); Rexford C. Tugwell, The Economic Basis of Public Interest 100 (1922)
(“[Courts allow] regulation of the prices and standards of service of a business under the
economic interest phase of the police power when: 1. The commodity or service is virtually a
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the industry to satisfy the public need on a reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory basis.
1. Necessity
Throughout the Progressive Era, it was common ground that a business
was “affected with a public interest” only if it controlled access to a neces-
sity. As Wyman explained in 1911:
This extraordinary activity of the law in behalf of the individual is . . .
confined to necessary services. The law has little concern with the monop-
olization of unessential things. It subjects a “scenic railway” at an amuse-
ment park to no exceptional liabilities. It leaves a circular railway built
primarily to view the Niagara Gorge outside the pale of State aid. And it
leaves skating rinks and theaters to deal as they please with their public,
and exclude whomsoever they choose.113
Still, necessity was a broad concept. It was linked not to bare survival,
but to ideas of dependence, expectation, and reliance. In 1926, the influen-
tial progressive economist John Maurice Clark explained that “[w]hat we
think of as economic coercion acts mainly through the power to withhold
access to goods or services, where the person from whom they are withheld
needs access to these particular goods or services so much that he is, or feels,
‘dependent’ on them in some substantial degree.”114 Pushing the point even
further, Rexford Tugwell—a future member of President Roosevelt’s brain
trust—canvassed the case law in 1922 and concluded that “[p]erhaps . . . the
most precise and complete definition would be one which would conceive a
necessity as any good or service which contributes to a psychologically full
life.”115
Something might be thought “necessary” not just for individuals, but
for society more broadly. The Supreme Court captured the thought in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, when it rejected an effort to regulate the sale of ice
because it was not “a paramount industry upon which the prosperity of the
entire state in large measure depends.”116 Frankfurter similarly emphasized
necessity. 2. There is maintained a price or a standard of service resulting in harm to
consumers.”).
113. 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at 99 (footnotes omitted); see also Tyson & Bro.-United
Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 440 (1927) (rejecting an effort to regulate
the price of admission to the theater in part because “in importance it falls below . . . an
interest in . . . food and shelter”); Charles Wolff Packing Co., 262 U.S. at 537 (“It has never been
supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the
baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such a
public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by State regulation.”);
A.M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle, 263 F. 134, 137 (D. Mont. 1920) (invalidating price regu-
lation that “ranges from the street corner vendor of popcorn and bananas to the merchant
prince, from coal to diamonds, from the babe’s first swaddling band and cradle to the aged
man’s shroud, his coffin, and his grave. Trifles, necessities, luxuries—all are within its scope”).
114. John M. Clark, Social Control of Business 115 (2d ed. 1939).
115. Tugwell, supra note 112, at 103.
116. 285 U.S. 262, 277–78 (1932).
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that “[o]ur whole social structure presupposes satisfactions for which we are
dependent upon private economic enterprise.”117 Linking necessity to the
economic and social development of the broader community helps explain
why banking and insurance, among other industries, were thought to be
affected with a public interest.118 As Freund explained, “banks and life insur-
ance companies are the depositaries of a large proportion of the savings of
the people, so that the management of each institution affects a considerable
part of the public.”119
2. Power
A business was not “affected with a public interest” merely because the
public was dependent on the goods or services that it controlled.120 In Wy-
man’s telling, the law of public callings served to protect against a business’s
exploitation of its monopoly power.121 In this, the law of public callings bore
a kinship to antitrust law: the latter aimed to prevent monopoly, the former
to control it. The idea that state power to regulate the economic affairs of
private business turned on the presence of monopolistic conditions found
expression in Supreme Court opinions throughout the period.122
Yet a business need not be monopolistic in a strict sense. An extraordi-
nary range of market features—the costs of shopping around, bargaining
inequalities, informational disadvantage, rampant fraud, collusive pricing,
emergency conditions, and more—could all frustrate competition and so
give rise to “virtual” or “practical” monopolies that would warrant state in-
tervention.123 By no means was the regulation of public callings confined to
117. Frankfurter, supra note 107, at 81; see also 2 Leverett S. Lyon & Victor Abram-
son, Government and Economic Life: Development and Current Issues of American
Public Policy 622 (1940) (observing that an individual’s need for public utilities “is aug-
mented by his indirect interest in living in a society where these services are readily available
for general social and industrial use”); Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in
American Law, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 277 (1928) (noting that the concept of a public utility
responded to “the sense, upon the part of contemporary society, of its dependence upon cer-
tain sorts of enterprises”).
118. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 414–15 (1914) (insurance);
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111–13 (1911) (banking).
119. Freund, supra note 93, at 419.
120. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1923);
see also Freund, supra note 93, at 388–89.
121. Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17
Harv. L. Rev. 156 (1903).
122. See, e.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co., 262 U.S. at 538; German Alliance Ins. Co., 233 U.S.
at 410; Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 403 (1894).
123. See Clark, supra note 114, at 151–61 (describing appropriate bases for economic
regulation apart from monopoly, including informational asymmetries, dependence on an-
other’s expertise, and providing a social minimum); 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at §§ 50–80
(cataloging the varied justifications for imposing duties of fair treatment on businesses and
distinguishing “natural monopolies” from “virtual monopolies”).
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the natural monopolies that today are thought to be its proper targets.124 The
1914 case German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis illustrates the point. In
upholding the constitutionality of a Kansas law fixing the rates for fire insur-
ance, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the price of insurance is not fixed over the counters of the companies by
what Adam Smith calls the higgling of the market, but formed in the coun-
cils of the underwriters, promulgated in schedules of practically controlling
constancy which the applicant for insurance is powerless to oppose and
which, therefore, has led to the assertion that the business of insurance is of
monopolistic character and that “it is illusory to speak of a liberty of
contract.”125
Far from insisting on what a modern economist would call a monopoly, the
Court approved Kansas’s effort to constrain market power arising from an-
other source—here, seemingly insurers’ superior information about an
opaque, complex financial product. German Alliance is not unusual. The
case law, though littered with references to monopoly, was often inattentive
to questions of market concentration.126 All innkeepers, for example, were
treated as affected with a public interest, however competitive the local mar-
ket for inns.127
The law of public callings was organized not around an orthodox eco-
nomic understanding of monopoly, but instead around a contestable politi-
cal idea of power. The key was the “consumer disadvantage”128 or
“widespread oppression”129 that could arise in the market. As Justice Stone
observed in 1927:
An examination of the decisions of this court in which price regulation has
been upheld will disclose that the element common to all is the existence of
a situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the
124. See Breyer, supra note 16, at 15–16. See generally N. Gregory Mankiw, Essentials
of Economics 278 (6th ed. 2012) (“An industry is a natural monopoly when a single firm can
supply a good or service to an entire market at a lower cost than could two or more firms.”).
125. 233 U.S. at 416–17.
126. See, e.g., Brass, 153 U.S. at 403 (“When . . . it is competent for the legislative power to
control the business of elevating and storing grain . . . in cities of one size and in some
circumstances, it follows that such power may be legally exerted over the same business when
carried on in smaller cities and in other circumstances.”); People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp.
v. La Fetra, 130 N.E. 601, 606–07 (N.Y. 1921) (“The power of regulation [of prices] . . . is not
limited to public uses or to property where the right to demand and receive service exists or to
monopolies or to emergencies.”); see also Tugwell, supra note 112, at 66 (“Monopoly is al-
most never established as a fact in these cases, though often inferred. That it is inferred, not
directly established, lends color to the theory that consumer disadvantage is in and by itself
sufficient to establish public interest.”).
127. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Prop-
erty, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1319–20 (1996) (“[N]o lawyer, judge, or treatise writer ever
suggested that innkeepers in cities like Boston should be exempt from the duty to serve the
public.”).
128. Tugwell, supra note 112, at 92.
129. La Fetra, 130 N.E. at 609.
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regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such a
disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic conse-
quences result to a very large number of members of the community.130
In the Progressive Era, the prevailing consensus was that the private market
was shot through with such consumer disadvantage.131 Public utility regula-
tion thus became the dominant governance strategy for managing important
industries that neither the market nor antitrust law could adequately
discipline.132
C. Medicine’s Absence
Yet medicine was absent from even the most capacious lists of industries
affected with a public interest. Why? If insurers and banks were regulated as
public callings, why not hospitals and doctors? The answer is straightfor-
ward: prior to the Second World War, the medical industry lacked the sort
of market power over essentials that called for state intervention.
The decades from 1870 through 1910 marked a period of enormous
change for medicine.133 At the close of the Civil War, hospitals in the United
States little resembled modern hospitals:
These institutions were primarily the last resort for the sick. Their stan-
dards of care did not approach those for the simplest custodial care today.
Hospital cleanliness was unknown, nursing was unskilled, equipment did
not include even the clinical thermometer. The pills and potions of visiting
staff physicians provided therapy. Major surgery was performed only in
dire emergencies and was confined largely to fractures and amputa-
tions. . . . “Patients dreaded the hospital and surgeons distrusted them-
selves, so much so that the hospital system itself was in danger of passing
out of society.”134
130. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 451–52
(1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
131. Fried, supra note 3, at 25 (“The view that monopolies were becoming the rule rather
than a limited exception to an otherwise competitive market . . . was widely shared among
centrist and even conservative economists and political theorists.”).
132. See id. at 112 (“By the early twentieth century, all but the strongest probusiness
forces agreed that it was appropriate for the government to intervene in any business that was
in the position to administer prices.”); Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39
Yale L.J. 1089, 1107 (1930) (“The system of control may be set down as three presumptions,
which are to be taken in order: . . . price is to be left to free enterprise; the antitrust laws are to
be used, if need be, . . . to keep enterprise free; and, if free enterprise cannot be made to . . .
work, resort is to be had to formal price-fixing.”).
133. See 1 Comm’n on Fin. of Hosp. Care, Factors Affecting the Costs of Hospital
Care 8 (John H. Hayes ed., 1954) (“[T]he general hospital, which had been essentially an
institution for custodial care, began at the turn of this century to evolve into an institution in
which the physician renders medical care.”).
134. Id. at 9 (quoting Howard W. Haggard, Mystery, Magic, and Medicine 167
(1933)).
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Over the next forty years, medicine started to come into its own as a
science. Medical schools became more rigorous and selective.135 Doctors
turned to hospital practice to enhance their public prestige and improve
their private practices. Hospitals became slightly safer and began to prolifer-
ate. Although large public hospitals, often in urban centers, remained at the
core of this growing hospital industry, the number of private, charitable hos-
pitals—often called “voluntary hospitals”—surged.136 By 1909, 4,359 hospi-
tals dotted the country, nearly the number in existence today.137
Endowed by private philanthropists and supported by the state, the vol-
untary hospitals were regulated not as private businesses but as charities.138
Consistent with hospitals’ charitable missions, most patients were still
housed in large, institutional wards; physicians typically didn’t charge for
their hospital-based practices; and many charitable hospitals still served a
large percentage of indigent patients.139
As voluntary hospitals rose to prominence, however, the ancient associa-
tion between hospital care and charity started to show strain. Financial pres-
sures pushed voluntary hospitals to avidly seek out paying customers,
particularly the well-off, to whom they provided private rooms and nicer
amenities.140 “From refuges mainly for the homeless poor and insane,” Paul
Starr explains, “[hospitals] evolved into doctors’ workshops for all types and
classes of patients. From charities, dependent on voluntary gifts, they devel-
oped into market institutions, financed increasingly out of payments from
patients.”141
The law was slow to respond to hospitals’ evolution from charitable en-
tities to market actors. The sheer number of cases in which municipalities
challenged the tax-exempt status of voluntary hospitals—because they de-
manded payment from all their patients, segregated paying patients from
nonpaying patients, or ran for-profit ventures alongside the nonprofit hos-
pital—suggests that many were not run along especially charitable lines.142
Some courts did recognize the inherently public nature of private chari-
ties.143 But the economic regulation of public callings arose to curb the ex-
cesses of profit-making businesses that, by dint of their practical monopoly
135. Starr, supra note 2, at 116–23.
136. Id. at 150–54.
137. Compare 1 Comm’n on Fin. of Hosp. Care, supra note 133, at 10, with Am. Hosp.
Ass’n, Hospital Statistics 3 (2012 ed.) (identifying 4,995 nonfederal U.S. hospitals in 2010).
138. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368 (1959) (“Charitable purposes include
. . . the promotion of health.”); Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J.
on Reg. 139, 148–50 (2007) (discussing history of charitable exemption).
139. See 1 Comm’n on Fin. of Hosp. Care, supra note 133, at 12–13.
140. See Starr, supra note 2, at 147–54.
141. Id. at 146.
142. See John A. Lapp & Dorothy Ketcham, Hospital Law 5 (1926) (reporting that
“[h]undreds of cases have been decided” on whether a hospital “is a charitable institution”).
143. See, e.g., In re Application for Judgment Against Certain Lots, 8 N.W. 595, 596
(Minn. 1881) (“The word ‘public’ has two proper meanings. A thing may be said to be public
when owned by the public, and also when its uses are public. The [private hospital] falls
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on important human needs, could exploit consumers. Charities fell in a dif-
ferent conceptual category: as one court put it in 1917, “the establishment of
charitable hospitals is in no sense a recognized business.”144 For charities, the
absence of a profit motive was thought to discourage the sorts of unfairness
that could characterize private dealings.145 There was no need for a law of
public callings to smooth the edges of market competition when charitable
hospitals stood outside that competition.
The charitable status of the voluntary hospitals thus distinguished them
from the private, for-profit businesses that were regulated as public utilities.
That distinction came under pressure not only because the voluntary hospi-
tals began to behave more like market actors,146 but also because, in the early
twentieth century, an increasing number of proprietary hospitals—private,
for-profit hospitals, usually established by physicians as stand-alone surgical
centers—started to crop up.147 Although the law of charities had no applica-
tion to these for-profit businesses, they undeniably served an important
public function, much like railroads and banks. Were they properly classified
as affected with a public interest?
That question went largely unanswered. The sharp practices of private
hospitals were simply not a salient issue.148 For most of the period, a hospital
stay was relatively cheap. In 1910, the average cost of a day in the hospital
was just $2, or less than $50 today in inflation-adjusted dollars.149 Concern
within this description of an institution of purely public charity. That patients who are able to
pay are charged for hospital services according to their ability, and that the county pays for
such services rendered to those who are a legal county charge, are facts of no importance upon
the question as to the character of the institution as one of purely public charity; for the fact
still remains, that, notwithstanding all receipts from such sources, the hospital is established,
maintained, and conducted without profit or a view to profit, and that, on the whole, it is
operated at a loss, which is necessarily made up by private contributions.”).
144. Lawrence v. Nissen, 91 S.E. 1036, 1038 (N.C. 1917); see also Van Campen v. Olean
Gen. Hosp., 210 A.D. 204, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924) (“That [voluntary hospitals] are engaged
in charitable work for the benefit of the public and thereby affected with a public interest, does
not make them public corporations.”)
145. See Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 57 (Pa. 1892) (“A
private hospital, built and conducted as a business enterprise, stands upon widely different
ground [from a charity]. There is no trust involved, no charitable use impressed, upon such an
establishment.”).
146. See Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the
Twentieth Century 122–23 (1989).
147. See Starr, supra note 2, at 219–20.
148. See Stevens, supra note 146, at 129 (“State legislatures . . . had little interest in
extending their authority over what appeared to be a successful mix of charitable, proprietary,
and local-government general hospitals . . . .”). A comprehensive 1926 treatise on hospital law
covers a wide range of topics, but makes no mention of the kind of economic regulation that
was regularly directed at public callings. See Lapp & Ketcham, supra note 142, at 205–13.
Nonetheless, in a brief section in his treatise, Wyman averred that private hospitals were af-
fected with the public interest: their activities, he explained, were “public in character.” 1
Wyman, supra note 5, at 60.
149. 1 Comm’n on Fin. of Hosp. Care, supra note 133, at 13.
82 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:57
with hospital charges first emerged in the 1920s,150 when just 3.5 percent of
gross national product went toward health care.151 (That figure stands at 17.2
percent today.152) Yet even in 1930, Walton Hamilton, a prominent sup-
porter of state control of private enterprise, could still write that “there is
little evidence that the price of bread, of clothing, of medical service, or of the
talkies needs to become a matter of legislative concern.”153 In part because
hospitalization wasn’t that expensive, hospital insurance was nonexistent for
most of the period, emerging only in the 1930s.
The modesty of hospital charges reflected the limits of medical sci-
ence.154 Antiseptic surgery was not widely used until the end of the nine-
teenth century; penicillin, not until the Second World War. The
ineffectiveness of medicine in the face of most disease meant that “for most
Americans, illness, injury, and early death were more to be suffered than
helped by a doctor, much less insured against.”155 Only in the early decades
of the twentieth century, according to the historian Rosemary Stevens, was
medicine “beginning its long transition from a luxury to a necessity, from a
privilege to a right.”156 Progressive reformers who worried about health con-
centrated not on medical care but on public-health measures—occupational
safety, improved sanitation, and control of contagious disease.157
For their part, physicians were unable to exercise the kind of market
power that might have made them the targets of economic regulation. If
physician prices were too high, Americans could go without medical care of
dubious efficacy. Many did. For most of the period, too, physicians operated
in a fiercely competitive environment. The absence of licensing laws, com-
pounded by the proliferation of thousands of medical schools willing to
confer degrees on paying students, complicated the profession’s efforts to
limit entry or consolidate its authority. As a result, physicians did not charge
150. See Starr, supra note 2, at 259.
151. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Develop-
ment and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. Med. & Ethics 141, 142 (1993). Even by 1945, urban
families spent just $150 on average per year on medical care. James T. Patterson, Grand
Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974, at 11 (1996).
152. See Anne B. Martin et al., National Health Spending in 2012: Rate of Health Spending
Growth Remained Low for the Fourth Consecutive Year, 33 Health Aff. 67, 67 (2014).
153. Hamilton, supra note 132, at 1100 n.54 (emphasis added).
154. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 151, at 141 (“Neither medicine nor health coverage
was very advanced prior to the Great Depression. Accustomed to the medical miracles of the
late 20th century, one tends to forget that 19th century doctors could do little for patients, and
hospitals were mainly charity wards where the poor went to die.”).
155. Id.; see also Patterson supra note 151, at 318 (“[A]s late as the 1930s[, physicians]
had been able to do little more than diagnose people and to console patients when they got
sick . . . .”).
156. Rosemary Stevens, American Medicine and the Public Interest 133 (1971);
see also 1 Comm’n on Fin. of Hosp. Care, supra note 133, at 13 (“[A]s hospital care became
increasingly expensive [from 1910 to 1935] it became more and more essential for those in all
economic groups.”).
157. See Wendy E. Parmet, Populations, Public Health, and the Law 38 (2009)
(“[P]ublic health’s influence on American law was at its zenith during the Progressive era.”).
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much for their services and the medical profession as a whole was not held
in especially high esteem.158 Far from wielding fearsome economic power,
physicians were disciplined by the market.
Not until the late 1890s did physicians secure state licensing laws that
restricted entry into the profession. Building on that foundation, physicians
began a painstaking effort over the following decades to consolidate their
status and power.159 Although successful in the end, physicians had, by the
eve of the Great Depression, only just begun to reap the benefits of their
newfound power in the market. It was still the case that “physicians did not
charge—or earn—large amounts. In 1929, for instance, the average net in-
come for non-salaried physicians was some $5,200,”160 or about $71,000 in
today’s dollars. (That figure stands at $190,000 today.161) Physicians saw that
income drop nearly in half over the next decade.162 In short, “in the era
before health insurance, when patients themselves paid for almost all health
care, the medical economy behaved much like the rest of the economy and
was small relative to the whole.”163
To contemporaries, the very idea that physicians were affected with a
public interest might have seemed like a category error. The Progressive Era
exhibited a deep faith in professionals, who were thought to operate outside
the theater of business and to stand as a bulwark against the rapacity of
private enterprise.164 Much as the charitable orientation of the voluntary
hospitals put them outside the category of private businesses affected with a
public interest, so too did physicians’ professional orientation make them an
awkward fit for the category of public callings.
Nonetheless, in 1911, Wyman mused about whether physicians might be
affected with a public interest. He closely examined the famous 1901 case of
Hurley v. Eddingfield, in which the Indiana Supreme Court held in a terse
opinion that a physician had no duty to treat a former patient who was in
dire need.165 Hurley’s curt rejection of the claim that physicians might be
likened to innkeepers or common carriers suggests that the analogy was far-
fetched. Wyman thought otherwise:
158. See Starr, supra note 2, at 79–144.
159. Id. at 232.
160. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 151, at 142.
161. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2012 National Occupational Employment and Wage Esti-
mates, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes_nat.htm#00-0000
(last modified Nov. 27, 2013). By way of comparison, lawyers earned on average about the
same amount as physicians in 1929; today, lawyers earn roughly one-third less. Compare Law-
rence R. Klein, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Professional Income: Lawyers and Dentists, 1929-48, 70
Monthly Lab. Rev. 396, 396 (1950), with U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra.
162. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 151, at 142.
163. Id.
164. See Hofstadter, supra note 83, at 148–64; see also Starr, supra note 2, at 140 (“In
the Progressive period, reformers and muckrakers crusading against business interests held up
professional authority as a model of public disinterestedness.”).
165. 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
84 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:57
When the need of the applicant is immediate the person from whom he
asks service has the upper hand. This monopoly may only be temporary;
but it is none the less real. . . . Here again this classification of the authori-
ties cannot as yet be safely taken as a generalization . . . . In [Hurley,] a
physician was held not liable for refusing service to a patient in a desperate
condition . . . . [T]he need was urgent, and in the nature of things must
always be. But perhaps in the community at present there are enough of
such men always at hand to preclude the probability of injury by delay in
the average case. Or perhaps the modern law balks at requiring personal
service.166
Today, the casebooks present Hurley as an exemplar of the ancient common
law rule that physicians owe no duty to treat.167 Yet even in 1911, when
medicine was neither as effective nor as expensive as it is today, the laissez-
faire assumptions that animated Hurley were contested.
III. Public Utility Regulation in the Medical Industry
As medicine grew more technologically sophisticated, costly, and indis-
pensable in the postwar era, the business of medicine assumed the essential
attribute of a public calling: it acquired the power to abuse its control over a
necessity. It is no coincidence that courts began holding that hospitals were
“affected with a public interest” in the 1940s and 1950s.168 By then, the con-
stitutionality of economic legislation no longer turned on the label: the Su-
preme Court had discarded the “affected with a public interest” standard in
assessing constitutionality in the 1934 case of Nebbia v. New York.169 The
label nonetheless reflected growing concern that medicine had acquired
market power that it lacked in an earlier era.170
The concern is much more acute today. In Mark Hall and Carl Schnei-
der’s words, “enduring features of therapeutic relationships give rise to mo-
nopolistic power that is ripe for exploitation.”171 To protect patients in this
“desperate market,” Hall and Schneider call on courts to reinvigorate the
common law tradition, cataloged in Wyman’s treatise, of imposing special
166. 1 Wyman, supra note 5, at 86–87 (footnotes omitted).
167. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Health Care Law and Ethics 104, 109 (8th ed.
2013).
168. See, e.g., Nw. Hosp. v. Pub. Bldg. Serv. Emps.’ Union Local No. 113, 294 N.W. 215,
217–18 (Minn. 1940). Similarly, a 1939 Michigan statute regulated labor relations “where the
employer is operating a public utility, or hospital, or any other industry affected with a public
interest.” Local Union No. 876 v. State Labor Mediation Bd., 293 N.W. 809, 810 (Mich. 1940)
(emphasis added) (quoting 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts 176, § 13).
169. 291 U.S. 502, 536–37 (1934).
170. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444–46 (Cal. 1963) (offering a
litany of reasons, including the “essential nature of the service” and “superior bargaining
power,” for holding that a hospital contract was affected with a public interest); Greisman v.
Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 821–23 (N.J. 1963) (analogizing hospitals to innkeepers and
common carriers in holding that they were “affected with a public interest”).
171. Hall & Schneider, supra note 67, at 667.
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duties on public callings.172 But in focusing on judicial doctrine, Hall and
Schneider may have downplayed the significance of a host of laws enacted in
the postwar era that aimed to address the very problems they identify. This
Part surveys prominent examples of these laws, organizing its discussion
around the four duties of businesses affected with a public interest: to pro-
vide enough facilities to meet the public need, to serve all paying customers,
to charge them nondiscriminatory rates, and to offer a fair price.173 To a
much greater extent than is commonly appreciated, health law bears the dis-
tinctive mark of the law of public callings.
To be clear, the claim is not that the entire business of medicine was
once treated as a pure public utility. The economic regulation of physician
practices, for example, has been and remains uncommon. Instead, such reg-
ulation has typically been directed at hospitals, which are responsible for the
largest share of the nation’s medical spending, as well as at insurers, which
finance most medical care. Even there, public utility regulation has been
incomplete, subjecting hospitals and insurers at varying times to more and
less stringent duties to fairly serve the public. Especially since the 1980s,
much (but by no means all) such regulation has given way to a renewed faith
in the market.174
The claim instead is that seemingly disparate state and federal laws can
be collectively understood to reflect a coherent effort, characteristic of the
public utility tradition, to curb the economic power of the medical industry
by inhibiting the free use of its private property. In this, the laws stand as a
rejection of the premise that the market will adequately meet the public
need for accessible, fairly priced health care. They also belie the conventional
assumption that treating medicine as a utility would break decisively with
the American regulatory tradition.
A. Supply
The years after the Second World War marked an inflection point for
health care.175 Medical advances, vividly on display among troops in combat,
172. Id. at 666–67, 684 (citing 1 Wyman, supra note 5).
173. Wyman, supra note 121, at 156 (“[I]n public businesses one must serve all that apply
without exclusive conditions, provide adequate facilities to meet all the demands of the con-
sumer, exact only reasonable charges for the services that are rendered, and between customers
under similar circumstances make no discriminations.”); see also Freund, supra note 93, at
382 (“Turning to the special control exercised over [businesses affected with a public interest],
we find that it assumes one or more of the following forms: the regulation of charges; the
requirement of equal service; requirements in the interest of public convenience; and require-
ments and restraints in the interest of financial security.”); Wilson et al., supra note 103, at
vii (“The obligation to render adequate service at reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates has
long been recognized as a duty of public utility enterprises.”).
174. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 Health Matrix 155, 156
(2004) (“The market competition model developed in the early 1970s, began affecting policy
very quickly, and became the dominant paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s.”).
175. See Patterson, supra note 151, at 67 (“Faith in medicine and in the goodness of
physicians rose dramatically among the middle classes who could afford them.”).
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contributed to a felt need to assure that returning soldiers and the civilians
who had contributed to the war effort had access to needed care.176 Yet hos-
pital construction had stalled during the Depression, leaving the nation’s
hospital system in tatters, even as private hospital admissions more than
doubled from 1935 to the end of the war.177
Building new hospitals could have been left to the private market. Be-
cause of the rapid spread of hospital insurance—virtually nonexistent in
1930, but covering more than 77 million people by 1951—hospitals were on
sounder financial footing than ever before.178 Nevertheless, as the war came
to a close, the mismatch between medical need and hospital supply led to a
bipartisan call for hospital planning.179 The push for planning reflected the
view that the proper distribution of hospitals, with their newfound public
importance, could not be left to the hurly burly of the market.180
Planning was first embraced as a national goal in 1946 with Congress’s
enactment of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, more commonly
known as Hill-Burton.181 Building on state-level experiments with hospital
planning started in the 1920s,182 Hill-Burton used the promise of federal
money to encourage state planning agencies to survey the need for hospital
construction and develop plans to meet that need.183 The federal money was
not insubstantial. Although the Act initially authorized just $75 million for
hospital construction, the federal government would eventually spend $4.4
billion over three decades to build and upgrade medical facilities, amounting
to roughly 8 percent of the total costs of hospital construction nationwide.184
With federal money on the line, every state in the country save Nevada
had, by 1948, submitted plans detailing their hospital needs.185 These plans
were meant not only to channel public subsidies, but also to guide develop-
ment more generally.186 “For the first time,” the Surgeon General declared,
176. See David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depres-
sion and War, 1929–1945, at 716 (1999).
177. See Starr, supra note 2, at 176–77; Stevens, supra note 146, at 204.
178. See Sylvia A. Law, Blue Cross: What Went Wrong? 6, 11 (1974).
179. See Stevens, supra note 146, at 213–16.
180. Cf. Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 Yale L.J. 1227, 1230–32
(1966) (linking the rise of planning to the regulation of public service corporations).
181. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, tit. VI, 60 Stat. 1040,
1041–49 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2012)). For a general discussion, see Stevens,
supra note 146, at 216–24.
182. See Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass:
Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 203, 233 (1980).
183. See Hospital Survey and Construction Act, § 601(a) (assisting state planning agencies
to devise plans for “furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and similar services to all their
people”).
184. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1382, at 24, 26 (1974).
185. Stevens, supra note 146, at 221.
186. See Inst. of Med., Health Planning in the United States: Issues in Guideline
Development 10–11 (1980), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9937&page=R1
(defining planning and distinguishing it from overt regulation).
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“a national policy is established whereby hospitals and health centers are to
be planned, located and operated in relation to the over-all health needs of
the people.”187 As Stevens notes:
On paper, at least, these plans were impressive. . . . [T]he United States had
a nationally defined, regionally organized network for hospital provision—
a grid of lines of coordination across the country. The hospital plans, taken
together, looked like plans for the national distribution of electricity. . . .
Hospitals were regarded as a national resource which should be organized
rationally as a national system.188
During the 1960s, Hill-Burton was repeatedly amended to expand the
role of state planning agencies and subsidize a wider array of construction.189
As Hill-Burton changed focus, so too did health planning. Planning agencies
were asked to assess (among other things) the need for community mental
health facilities,190 nursing homes,191 rehabilitation facilities,192 and neighbor-
hood health centers.193 In 1965, Congress allocated $600 million to regional
medical programs that would coordinate treatments for heart disease, can-
cer, and stroke.194 And in 1966, Congress overhauled the health-planning
apparatus and appropriated almost $200 million for “comprehensive health
planning” at the state level over the next eight years.195 By the mid-1960s,
health planning had entrenched itself as the preferred tool for channeling
public subsidies toward areas of perceived need.
Yet planning in the Hill-Burton era lacked regulatory bite. Planning
agencies could call for the construction of needed facilities and direct federal
and state money toward desired projects, but they couldn’t compel private
187. Parran Sees Gains for Public Health: Annual Report Hails Hospital Building Plan, Psy-
chiatry Aid and World Organizing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1947, at 14.
188. Stevens, supra note 146, at 221.
189. See U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Hill-Burton Program Pro-
gress Report, July 1, 1947 - June 30, 1971, at 27 (1972) (“[T]he focus [of Hill-Burton] has
shifted from the prime objective of providing general hospitals in rural areas, then to con-
structing sorely needed long-term care facilities for the growing numbers of chronically ill and
aged, still later to the modernization of obsolete inpatient care facilities primarily in urban
areas, and most recently to increased emphasis on . . . outpatient facilities.”).
190. See Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construc-
tion Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, §§ 134–35, 77 Stat. 282, 287–88 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. § 291 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-
287, and 113-291))).
191. See Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78
Stat. 447, 447–62 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 (2014) (West, Westlaw through
P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291))).
192. See Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-391, § 8, 82 Stat.
297, 300–01 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 35 (1970)), repealed by Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, § 500(a), 87 Stat 355, 390.
193. See Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-296, §§ 110–11, 84 Stat. 336, 339–40 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 (2014)
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291))).
194. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1382, at 15 (1974).
195. See id. at 9.
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hospitals or physician practices to do anything. “At best,” the Institute of
Medicine reported in 1980, “health planning was viewed as inconsequential,
and often it was irrelevant to the development of health care delivery, utili-
zation of services or health care expenditures.”196 Perhaps for that reason,
“[h]ospitals, physicians, and others who had feared and opposed the plan-
ning movement as the enemy of professional and institutional autonomy
now saw it as a lesser evil than the growing threat of direct public
regulation.”197
Around the same time, skyrocketing medical spending made it harder to
defend Hill-Burton. Roemer’s Law—the theory, articulated by Milton Roe-
mer, that a built bed is a filled bed198—came into vogue, suggesting that
facility construction was itself contributing to medical spending.199 The 1965
enactment of Medicare, which lavishly reimbursed hospitals and other insti-
tutional providers for their capital expenses, exacerbated the problem.
Health planners began to see that assuring access to reasonably priced health
care required more than public subsidies and community meetings. Increas-
ingly, planners sought to prevent heedless, duplicative facility construction.
Their primary technique for doing so—certificate-of-need (CON) legis-
lation—reprised the Progressive Era innovation of demanding that public
utilities secure “certificates of convenience and necessity” before construct-
ing new facilities.200 The idea behind CON is simple: prior to undertaking
certain capital-intensive projects or purchasing expensive new equipment,
hospitals or other medical facilities must secure a permit from a state plan-
ning agency. If the proposed investment is judged unnecessary to satisfy a
local need for medical services, the permit is denied.
In 1966, a run of large premium increases for Blue Cross plans
prompted New York to enact the nation’s first CON law for the medical
sector.201 Over the next six years, twenty states followed suit.202 In 1972,203
and then more forcefully in 1974,204 Congress enacted legislation to push for
196. Inst. of Med., supra note 186, at 15 (quoting Herbert E. Klarman, Health Planning:
Progress, Prospects, and Issues, 56 Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 78. 79 (1978)).
197. Id. at 14–15.
198. See Milton I. Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, J.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36 .
199. See Inst. of Med., supra note 186, at 7–8 (linking health planning, and limitations
on supply, to Roemer’s law).
200. See Wilson et al., supra note 103, at 33 (“The public utility acts of practically all
states provide that no person or corporation shall undertake and engage in the supplying of at
least certain types of public utility service without first having obtained from the public service
commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity.”); Ford P. Hall, Certificates of
Convenience and Necessity, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 107–08 (1929).
201. See James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of
Health Facilities to State Control, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1025, 1036 (1986).
202. Id.
203. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1329,
1386 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §1320a-1 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-
296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291))).
204. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.
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CON’s nationwide adoption. CON quickly became ubiquitous.205 According
to the Institute of Medicine, “[t]he certificate-of-need programs constitute
the closest the United States comes to nationwide control of the supply of
health services and the spread of expensive new technology.”206
Anticipating that CON would form a key part of a reinvigorated health-
planning apparatus, Congress’s 1974 legislation combined the various re-
sponsibilities that Congress had previously assigned to disparate planning
agencies and handed them to a set of regional “health systems agencies.”207
Subject to oversight from statewide and national coordinating councils,
these revamped agencies—there were usually three or four in each state—
would distribute Hill-Burton funds, undertake comprehensive health plan-
ning, and coordinate regional medical programs.208 By discouraging wasteful
but remunerative medical investments, CON could spur investments in
health-care resources that might otherwise be in scarce supply.
In the 1980s, enthusiasm for CON began to wane. As studies demon-
strated that CON did little or nothing to control medical inflation, questions
arose about its wisdom and necessity.209 Concern mounted that dominant
hospitals were exploiting CON to erect barriers to entry and squelch compe-
tition.210 In addition, the 1983 reform of Medicare’s hospital-payment
scheme and the steady proliferation of managed care organizations intro-
duced new incentives for cost-containment into the health-care system, ar-
guably diminishing the need for state oversight of capital expenditures. After
Congress repealed its pro-CON legislation, a number of states ended their
programs.211 Even so, CON was hardly abandoned. To this day, CON re-
mains in place in roughly two-thirds of the states.212
* * *
As Wyman and others emphasized during the Progressive Era, public
service corporations owe a duty to the public to provide adequate facilities
205. See Simpson, supra note 201, at 1055.
206. Inst. of Med., supra note 186, at 19.
207. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1382, at 30–33 (1974).
208. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975).
209. See, e.g., Christopher J. Conover & Frank A. Sloan, Does Removing Certificate-of-Need
Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care Spending?, 23 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 455, 456
(1998) (“[A] substantial amount of empirical evidence accumulated by the early 1980s indi-
cat[ed] that CON regulations were ineffective in cost containment.”).
210. See generally Payton & Powsner, supra note 182 (so arguing).
211. See Health Planning, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
212. See Jill R. Horwitz & Daniel Polsky, Cross Border Effects of State Health Technology
Regulation, 1 Am. J. Health Econ. 101, 107 fig.1 (2015).
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to meet the public need.213 In medicine, that duty found aspirational expres-
sion in Hill-Burton before gaining a regulatory foothold through CON.214
B. Service
Under the common law, “[a] private hospital owes the public no duty to
accept any patient not desired by it, and it is not necessary to assign any
reason for its refusal to accept a patient for hospital service.”215 The same is
said to hold true for physicians.216 Contrary to this accepted common law
wisdom, however, hospitals and physicians are in fact legally obliged to serve
many of those who seek their services. Because traits like race, religion, and
disability supply the most common reasons for refusing service, the story of
how the duty to serve became stitched into health law is in part a story about
the development of the civil rights laws. But only in part. The service obliga-
tion doesn’t just prohibit specific types of especially harmful discrimination.
It is instead an affirmative duty to serve to the extent of the business’s abil-
ity. In medicine, this broader access norm—one that prohibits discrimina-
tion on almost any ground save ability to pay—has found expression
through the special duties imposed on charitable hospitals and, more re-
cently, through EMTALA.
1. Civil Rights
Under the common law, private charitable hospitals were required to
accept, within the limits of their capacities, members of the public on whose
behalf the hospital had been established.217 Often that was the public at
large: cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regularly
spoke of hospitals that do “not discriminate as to race, sex or religion, but
receiv[e] equally all who apply.”218 Yet the common law declined to extend a
full-fledged service obligation. Hospitals established on behalf of a particular
religion or race, for example, could restrict access to members of those
groups.219 And hospital trustees were empowered to select which members
213. Wyman, supra note 5, at xi.
214. See Starr, supra note 2, at 376 (“In the United States, where planning has never been
widely approved as a role for government, health planning was a limited exception.”).
215. 41 C.J.S., Hospitals, § 8, at 345 (1944) (citing Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews,
157 So. 224, 225 (Ala. 1934)).
216. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Law and the American Health Care System 17–19 (2d
ed. 2012).
217. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 372, 374 (1959).
218. Philadelphia v. Pa. Hosp., 8 Pa. C. 72, 74 (1890); see also Hot Springs Sch. Dist. v.
Sisters of Mercy of Female Acad. of Little Rock, Ark., 106 S.W. 954, 954 (Ark. 1907); Sisters of
the Third Order of St. Francis v. Bd. of Review, 83 N.E. 272, 273 (Ill. 1907); Lutheran Hosp.
Ass’n v. Baker, 167 N.W. 148, 149 (S.D. 1918); St. Joseph’s Hosp. Ass’n v. Ashland Cnty., 72
N.W. 43, 43 (Wis. 1897).
219. See Lapp & Ketcham, supra note 142, at 213.
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of the public they would serve. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court ex-
plained in 1876, “no person has individually a right to demand admission to
[a charitable hospital’s] benefits.”220
That attitude slowly began to change after the Second World War. Build-
ing on the public orientation of charitable hospitals, Hill-Burton required
hospitals that received federal subsidies to make their facilities available on a
nondiscriminatory basis (albeit with a pre-Civil Rights Era allowance for
separate-but-equal facilities).221 Hill-Burton was just the beginning. Two de-
cades later, with the connection to health care “prominent in the minds of
its authors,”222 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimi-
nation in any programs receiving federal financial assistance.223 The enact-
ment of Medicare and Medicaid the following year made Title VI a powerful
tool to induce hospitals to offer medical services to the public on a nondis-
criminatory basis.224
Still, Title VI marked only a partial advance. Bowing to political pres-
sure, the Johnson administration declined to characterize Medicare pay-
ments to physicians as federal financial assistance.225 And Title II of the Act,
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sex in
“public accommodations,” pointedly did not extend to hospitals and physi-
cians’ offices.226 Under federal law and most state laws, physicians thus re-
mained free to discriminate.227
A quarter century later, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) marked a transformative step in bringing the service obligation to
medicine.228 Like the Civil Rights Act, the ADA prohibited discrimination in
220. McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 435 (1876).
221. Hill-Burton also required those hospitals to provide “a reasonable volume of hospital
services to persons unable to pay therefor,” Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No.
79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291e (2012)), but this was
understood to be aspirational. As James Blumstein explains, Hill-Burton “was not designed as
a program to pay for indigent care. Rather, it was a program designed to develop facilities to
which access would be available to all on a nondiscriminatory basis.” James F. Blumstein,
Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a Case Study, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1227, 1229
(1984). To put it slightly differently, Hill-Burton was not social-welfare legislation. It reflected
the sort of economic regulation to which public callings had long been subjected.
222. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Health-
care System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v.
Sandoval, 3 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 215, 220 (2003).
223. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252–53 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (2012)).
224. See David Barton Smith, Health Care Divided 115–21 (1999).
225. See Joel Teitelbaum & Sara Rosenbaum, Medical Care as a Public Accommodation:
Moving the Discussion to Race, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 381, 382 & n.8 (2003).
226. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. II.
227. Teitelbaum & Rosenbaum, supra note 225, at 386 & n.28 (noting that the twenty
states with public accommodations laws didn’t cover hospitals or physicians’ offices).
228. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101–07, 104
Stat. 327, 330–36 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2006)).
92 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:57
public accommodations. Unlike the Civil Rights Act however, the ADA in-
cluded hospitals and physicians’ offices within the scope of its protections.229
By 1990, this extension of public-accommodations law to medicine was so
uncontroversial as to pass almost unnoticed.230
2. Revenue Rulings
Although the civil rights laws made inroads on the classical view that
property owners have an absolute right to exclude, they aimed primarily to
eradicate institutional discrimination against disfavored groups. As such, the
civil rights laws overlap with, but are distinct from, the service obligation. In
some respects, the service obligation is narrower: businesses not typically
thought to be “affected with a public interest”—barber shops and grocery
stores, for example—are still subject to the civil rights laws. In other re-
spects, the service obligation is broader: where it applies, it not only prohib-
its discrete types of discrimination but also imposes an affirmative duty to
serve.
As early as 1956, that broader duty began to be imposed in the health-
care sector through the vehicle of federal tax law.231 In a significant revenue
ruling, the IRS determined that voluntary hospitals, which accounted for
two-thirds of all hospital admissions in the country,232 would be considered
charitable (and thus tax-exempt) only if they were “formed for the purpose
of furnishing hospital facilities to all persons in the community at the lowest
possible cost.”233 The revenue ruling thus reflected a legal recognition that
charitable hospitals could not exclude patients at will.
The service obligation assumed greater prominence in a 1969 revenue
ruling updating the IRS’s rules on nonprofit hospitals.234 Two features of the
1969 ruling are noteworthy. First, the ruling obligated charitable hospitals to
treat Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.235 The duty to serve those pa-
tients thus increased the pressure on nonprofit hospitals to accept federal
funding—funding that would, in turn, expose them to the strictures of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. Second, the revenue ruling required nonprofit
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012) (defining “public accommodations,” for purposes of the
ADA, to include “professional office[s] of a health care provider” and “hospital[s]”).
230. Teitelbaum & Rosenbaum, supra note 225, at 389.
231. For a discussion of the revenue rulings, see Horwitz, supra note 138, at 151–52.
232. See F.H. Arestad & Mary A. McGovern, Hospital Service in the United States, 152
JAMA 143, 144 tbl.C (1953).
233. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (emphasis added).
234. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
235. See id. (requiring treatment “for all those persons in the community able to pay the
cost thereof either directly or through third party reimbursement”); E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.
v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[H]ospitals seeking to qualify as charities
pursuant to Revenue Ruling 69-545 must accept Medicare and Medicaid patients . . . .”).
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hospitals to operate “an emergency room open to all persons.”236 The con-
nection here to the law of public callings is unmistakable.237 Having built a
hospital and opened it to the public, the law imposed a duty to offer a
needed public service (a blunt form of health planning) and to serve all in
need of that service.238
3. EMTALA
In the mid-1980s, highly publicized incidents of “patient dumping”—
the practice of refusing emergency medical services to those who can’t af-
ford care239—prompted Congress to enact the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).240 As a condition of participating in
Medicare, EMTALA requires hospitals with emergency rooms, as well as
their on-call physicians, to treat any person who either has an emergency
medical condition or is in advanced labor.241 Because Medicare participation
is a financial necessity for nearly all hospitals, and because the treatment
duty extends to the general public, not just Medicare beneficiaries, EMTALA
imposes what is in effect a limited service obligation on all hospitals.
EMTALA mirrors a number of state court decisions holding that, under
the common law, emergency rooms must accept for treatment anyone who
presents with an emergency condition.242 Some of those decisions were pre-
mised on the conclusion that hospitals were affected with a public interest.243
Still others invoked the reliance interests that were arguably implicated when
emergency rooms held themselves out as open to the public244—a move that
features prominently in cases involving public callings.245
In the years after its enactment, EMTALA has come in for serious aca-
demic criticism. EMTALA may encourage hospitals to shut their emergency
236. 1969-2 C.B.
237. See Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 Jurimetrics J.
389, 390 (1988) (“Largely due to the conception of hospitals as businesses affected with the
public interest, for decades these institutions have been subject to numerous sources of law
that impose more scrutiny on their criteria for patient selection.” (footnotes omitted)).
238. In 1983, the IRS somewhat softened the obligation to operate an emergency room,
but only when a state planning agency found that opening another emergency room would be
“unnecessary and duplicative.” Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
239. See David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8
Health Matrix 29, 32–33 (1998).
240. See Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. IX,
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012)).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (2012).
242. See Hall, supra note 237, at 392 (“Since the Manlove decision in 1961, no court has
refused to require at least stabilizing care in a serious emergency, and several decisions have
gone much further.”).
243. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984) (en
banc); Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1982).
244. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961).
245. See Singer, supra note 127, at 1308.
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rooms.246 Hospitals may cope with EMTALA’s unfunded obligation by in-
flating prices for paying patients, many of whom cannot pay more for their
care.247 And EMTALA papers over the problem of the uninsured.248 As David
Hyman reports, however, “[t]he statute is wildly popular across the entirety
of the political spectrum, and among such disparate interest groups as phy-
sicians, advocates for the poor, professors of law and public health, and con-
sumer groups.”249 EMTALA owes its popularity to the deeply felt and widely
shared belief that private hospitals violate a public trust when they refuse
medical care to those in need.
* * *
The service obligation in medicine is by no means fully developed. The
civil rights laws protect only against discrimination on certain protected
grounds; the rules for charitable organizations demand treatment only of
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries; and EMTALA applies only to emer-
gency services. As the authors of a leading casebook speculate, “[p]erhaps
this body of law is not more developed because doctors and hospitals rarely
turn away patients who can pay.”250 Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the net-
work of laws regulating access to medical services reflects the impulse that
private actors serving important needs owe a legal duty to serve the public.
C. Nondiscriminatory Rates
As an adjunct to the service obligation, the law has traditionally re-
quired public service corporations to charge the same rates for the same
services. Otherwise, the service obligation would be of little value: private
businesses could either gouge those in desperate need or hike their prices for
those whom they preferred not to serve.
In contrast to health planning and the service obligation, prohibitions
on price discrimination have not taken hold when it comes to the direct
regulation of hospitals and other providers. By and large, providers retain
wide freedom to charge different patients different prices.251 Yet few people
pay directly for medical services. In the private market, most get insurance
either through their employers or, less commonly, on the individual market.
246. Richard A. Epstein, Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?
95–98 (1997).
247. Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care:
The Regressive Profile of a “Hidden Tax”, 2 Health Matrix 141 (1992).
248. See Hall, supra note 237, at 394–95.
249. Hyman, supra note 239, at 29.
250. Hall et al., supra note 167, at 117.
251. State restrictions on “balance billing”—the practice of charging patients more than
what Medicare or Medicaid pays for their services—are a limited exception. See, e.g., Mass.
Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding such a restriction).
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Because the insured are insulated from the full price of their care, discrimi-
natory pricing at the hospital or in a physician’s office is often not an urgent
concern.
The pricing practices of insurers are more worrisome. An insurer that
charges actuarially fair rates will charge the old and unhealthy more for in-
surance than the young and healthy. Whether “experience rating” amounts
to price discrimination in the classical sense is contestable: even if the terms
and benefits package of two health plans are identical, the plan sold to the
sicker person is, as an actuarial matter, quite different from the plan sold to
the healthier person.252 Many people nonetheless view experience rating as
unfair discrimination on the basis of health.
Experience rating was not a feature of the health-insurance market
when it first arose in the 1930s. The voluntary hospitals, confronted with a
funding crisis arising from the confluence of rising medical costs and the
Depression, moved to establish Blue Cross organizations to serve as their
financing arms.253 Aligning themselves with the community orientation of
the voluntary hospitals, these early Blue Cross organizations charged a sin-
gle, uniform “community rate.”254
That didn’t last long, however. When Blue Cross proved the success of
the business model, private insurers quickly entered the market. That put
Blue Cross plans in an unenviable spot. Because healthier people were at-
tracted to the new, experience-rated plans, Blue Cross organizations had to
hike their premiums to cover the larger medical costs of their relatively un-
healthy enrollees. Doing so, however, only drove more healthy people away.
By the mid-1950s, Blue Cross plans relented to market pressure and, like the
private insurers, began to charge sicker enrollees more for their coverage.255
The desire to guard against “unfair” price discrimination in the insur-
ance market has prompted a number of legislative interventions. In the early
1990s, the harshness of experience rating—especially for small businesses,
which could find insurance out of reach if a single employee contracted a
high-cost illness—provoked forty-five states to limit insurers’ ability to dis-
criminate on the basis of health status in the small-group market.256 A hand-
ful of those states, including New York, mandated pure or nearly pure
community rating in both the individual and small-group markets.257
252. See Breyer, supra note 16, at 17 (“ ‘Price discrimination’ means, charging, say, differ-
ent customers two or more different prices for the identical product.”).
253. Law, supra note 178, at 6–7.
254. See id. at 11–12.
255. See Herman M. Somers & Anne R. Somers, Private Health Insurance, Part Two:
Problems, Pressures and Prospects, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 508, 514 (1958).
256. See Thomas Buchmueller & John DiNardo, Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse
Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, 92 Am. Econ.
Rev. 280, 280 (2002).
257. See Office of Health Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Regu-
lation of the Individual Health Insurance Market 24–26 (2008), aspe.hhs.gov/health/
reports/08/reginsure/report.pdf (identifying seven states that mandate some form of commu-
nity rating in the individual market and eleven states that do so in the small-group market).
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The federal government soon got into the reform game. In the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Congress
prohibited employers from crafting eligibility rules or raising a worker’s pre-
miums based on health status.258 HIPAA thus served as an employer-specific
prohibition on price discrimination. The enactment of the Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 went a small step further in barring
employers and insurers from using genetic information to deny coverage or
increase premiums.259 And the ACA went much further by prohibiting all
insurers in the small-group and individual markets—not only those on the
exchanges—from experience rating.260 Insurance premiums can still vary
based on geography, family status, tobacco use, and age.261 Otherwise, insur-
ers must offer the same rate to all comers. In this the ACA represents a
partial extension of the public utility model into medicine.262 The ACA,
however, draws the line at insurers, eschewing public utility regulation when
it comes to physicians, hospitals, and other providers.
D. Fair Rates
As with other aspects of the public utility model, rate regulation became
prominent in the medical industry in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The earliest price controls came through the oversight of Blue Cross
plans. A handful of state insurance commissioners—seven in 1974—had the
authority to review the rates that Blue Cross plans charged to assure they
were not “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”263 Eleven more
required rates to be “fair and reasonable.”264 Most exercised the authority
gingerly, but a few, including Pennsylvania, pushed hard to curb Blue Cross
premiums.265
These early efforts to control medical spending were not terribly effec-
tive. As medical inflation continued to escalate, attention shifted to direct
oversight of hospital rates. Starting with New York in 1969, eight states, con-
centrated in the Northeast, moved over the next decade to impose price
258. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 702, 110 Stat. 1936, 1945 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1182
(2012)).
259. See Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C).
260. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2701, 124
Stat. 119, 155–56 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012)).
261. Id.
262. See Sara Rosenbaum, A “Broader Regulatory Scheme” — The Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 1881, 1881–82 (2010) (“The [ACA] fundamentally
transforms health insurance from a product designed to preserve profitability in the face of
rampant adverse selection to a regulated industry whose long-term strength and stability are
essential to the public interest and that, in its restructured form, will therefore take on certain
characteristics of a public utility.”).
263. Law, supra note 178, at 13.
264. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. See id. at 17, 112–13.
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controls on hospitals.266 At least nineteen more monitored hospital prices.267
Four states—New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland—took an
especially comprehensive approach to rate regulation. They fixed not only
the rates that private insurers and Medicaid would pay for hospital services,
but also secured federal waivers requiring Medicare to pay hospitals at the
state-regulated rates. In the 1970s, this “all-payer rate-setting” dominated
the debate over how to restrain hospital prices.268
“In no state was the ‘public utility’ model of rate regulation more con-
spicuous than in the Empire State . . . .”269 Enacted in large part to cut
cripplingly large Medicaid expenditures, New York’s price control laws ini-
tially targeted the rates that hospitals could charge Blue Cross and Medicaid.
As Sylvia Law explained in 1974:
The theory of the New York cost control plan is that, in the absence of
competitive market influence, an incentive-penalty mechanism is needed to
keep hospital prices down. The incentive is the amount of money the hos-
pital can plan on and retain if its annual costs total less than its budget
projection. Similarly, the amount by which a hospital’s costs exceed its pro-
jected budget becomes a financial penalty which the hospital must
absorb.270
Over the next decade, New York gradually expanded the scope of its price
controls until they covered all payers, including Medicare.271
New Jersey tackled rate regulation somewhat differently. Rather than
capping overall hospital budgets, New Jersey demanded that hospitals
change how they billed for care. No longer could they bill per service or per
day; instead, hospitals in New Jersey would bill per case. Under this new
diagnosis-related group (DRG) system, hospitals would charge a fixed sum
for treating a patient with a particular condition (say, acute pneumonia),
giving the hospital an incentive to treat conservatively.272 New Jersey’s exper-
iment with per-case pricing served as the foundation for Medicare’s shift to
DRGs in 1983.273 But where Medicare used DRGs to pin responsibility for
controlling costs on hospitals, New Jersey remained committed to a public
266. See Frank A. Sloan, Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost Control: Evidence
from the Last Decade, 61 Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 195, 197–98 (1983).
267. See id. at 198 tbl.1.
268. Gerard F. Anderson, All-Payer Ratesetting: Down but Not Out, Health Care Fi-
nancing Review, 1991 Supp., at 35, 35 (“All-payer ratesetting for hospitals was at the center
of the policy paradigm for controlling health care costs during the 1970s.”).
269. Robert B. Hackey, Commentary, Regulatory Regimes and State Cost Containment Pro-
grams, 18 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 491, 495 (1993).
270. Law, supra note 178, at 105.
271. See Anderson, supra note 268, at 35–36.
272. See Rick Mayes & Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Prospective Payment and
the Shaping of U.S. Health Care 24–27 (2006) (describing New Jersey’s adoption of
DRGs).
273. Id.
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utility model of rate regulation.274 It is no accident, as Bruce Vladeck notes,
“that the statute creating the New Jersey DRG system is in fact literally an
amendment to the state’s health planning law.”275
Experience in New York and New Jersey convinced many observers in
the 1970s that price controls were inevitable.276 In an effort to fend off fed-
eral oversight, the American Hospital Association established an Advisory
Panel on Public Utility Regulation and in 1972 accepted the panel’s endorse-
ment of model legislation that would establish independent rate-regulation
commissions at the state level.277 Three years later, Congress authorized
grants for states to explore rate regulation.278 And in 1977, President Carter,
as a cornerstone of his effort to tackle inflation, proposed federal legislation
that would—as he explained in a message to Congress—“restrain increases
in the reimbursements which hospitals receive from all sources: Medicare,
Medicaid, Blue Cross, commercial insurers, and individuals.”279 Under pres-
sure from the hospital industry, Carter’s bill was narrowly defeated in
1979.280
The defeat of the bill was a harbinger of a diminished appetite in the
1980s for all-payer rate-setting. Starting with Wisconsin in 1986, nearly
every state moved to dismantle its rate-setting apparatus.281 Today, only two
states—Maryland and West Virginia—still impose price controls on hospi-
tals, and Maryland’s ability to sustain its system depends on a statutory
waiver requiring Medicare to pay Maryland hospitals based on state-negoti-
ated rates (and, not incidentally, allows Maryland providers to reap an addi-
tional $500 million every year in Medicare payments).282
274. See Bruce C. Vladeck, Diagnosis Related Group-Based Hospital Payment: The Real Is-
sues, 62 Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med. 46, 46–48 (1986).
275. Id. at 53–54.
276. See Lawrence D. Brown, Political Evolution of Federal Health Care Regulation, Health
Aff., Winter 1992, at 17, 25 (“Hospital association heads believed, and persuaded their con-
stituents, that federal rate regulation was on its way and that they might claim exemption for
their homegrown systems when that unhappy day arrived.”).
277. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Guidelines for Review and Approval of Rates for
Health Care Institutions and Services by a State Commission (1972) (accepted by the
Board of Trustees on Feb. 9, 1972).
278. See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-641, § 3, 88 Stat. 2225, 2227–59 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 1320a-1
(2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-
291))).
279. President Jimmy Carter, Health Care Legislation Message to the Congress (Apr. 25,
1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7401 (discussing the Hospital Cost Contain-
ment Act of 1977, H.R. 6575, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977)).
280. Steven V. Roberts, House Unit Defeats a Proposal to Curb Hospital Cost Rises: Major
Setback to President, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1978, at A1.
281. See John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, Health
Aff., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 142, 143–44.
282. Mark Pauly & Robert Town, Maryland Exceptionalism? All-Payers Regulation and
Health Care System Efficiency, 37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 697, 699 (2012).
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Significantly, however, all-payer rate-setting was not discarded because
it had been proven ineffective. To the contrary, numerous studies showed
that rate-setting reduced per-capita and per-discharge prices, although the
evidence was mixed as to whether price controls reduced overall medical
expenditures.283 Instead, as John McDonough argues, managed care killed
price controls.284 Managed care organizations were expected to negotiate
forcefully with providers over prices. Because rate regulation would interfere
in those market negotiations, the waxing of managed care led to the waning
of rate regulation.
More generally, the surging interest in managed care in the 1980s re-
flected a renewed faith in the market and a growing distrust of government
solutions to complex social problems. That distrust extended to rate-setting
schemes, which were so complex that they fostered suspicion that powerful
hospitals manipulated them to their own advantage.285 In this newly skepti-
cal environment, supporters of all-payer rate-setting became “defensive
about acknowledging the parallels to [public] utility regulations.”286 Policy-
makers became so disenchanted with rate-setting by the early 1990s that all-
payer rate-setting virtually vanished from the public conversation.287 As Mc-
Donough explains, “[t]he public utility model for hospitals, popular with
many rate-setting pioneers, is a direct casualty in this transition.”288
* * *
In sum, public utility regulation has formed a strong undercurrent of
medical regulation in the modern era, particularly from 1945 to 1980. The
supply of medical resources has been overseen; public access has been guar-
anteed; price discrimination has been curbed; and rates have been regulated.
Because the public utility model is now out of fashion, the extent to which it
has shaped the regulation of medicine has been obscured. For similar rea-
sons, the policy debate today has distanced itself from the possibility of
treating medicine as a public utility.
IV. The Rise of Public Utility Regulation?
Growing faith in the market in the late 1970s and 1980s, a distrust of the
cartelization that could arise from single-industry regulation, the political
power of organized medicine, and the rise of managed care all contributed
to renewed skepticism about the wisdom of treating the medical industry as
283. See Karen Davis et al., Health Care Cost Containment 100–03 (1990) (review-
ing studies); Anderson, supra note 268 (same).
284. See McDonough, supra note 281, at 142.
285. Id. at 144.
286. Vladeck, supra note 274, at 48.
287. Anderson, supra note 268, at 35 (“[By the 1990s,] the discussion of all-payer rateset-
ting in national policy circles was almost non-existent . . . .”).
288. McDonough, supra note 281, at 148.
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a public utility. For medicine, approaches that attempt to leverage market
forces—not restrain them—have been dominant for three decades.289
The tide may be turning, however. The turn is hard to see in part be-
cause, in today’s political climate, the adoption of the public utility model at
the federal level seems quite unlikely. But the recent relentless focus on fed-
eral law, stoked by the long debate over the ACA and its tumultuous imple-
mentation, may have distracted from the possibilities of state intervention.
Even after the ACA’s reshaping of the insurance markets, states retain the
authority to regulate hospitals, physicians, and other providers. Not all states
will embrace public utility regulation. But might it play an increasingly im-
portant role in some?
Without question, political views about the propriety and wisdom of
economic regulation will matter. But public utility regulation may also be
more attractive in those states with more dysfunctional health-care markets.
Exorbitant insurance prices, for example, are an urgent concern in large
parts of Connecticut, Colorado, and Wisconsin.290 Similarly, access concerns
are expected to be more acute in sprawling rural states—including New
Mexico, Idaho, and Nevada—than in smaller states with large urban and
suburban populations.291
Heterogeneity of preferences and circumstances among the states partly
explains why they have historically taken the lead in adapting public utility
regulation to medicine. Health planning and CON legislation, although sup-
ported by the federal government, were both state-level efforts. State public
accommodations laws and emergency-care obligations antedated the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and EMTALA. A number of states moved ahead with
community rating in the insurance markets prior to the enactment of the
ACA. And New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts were trailblazers for
hospital rate setting.
A new generation of public utility regulation need not mimic these
older interventions. The states might, for example, reform their CON laws
to more closely superintend provider consolidation, the construction of ex-
pensive facilities, or the acquisition of novel technologies. They might enact
legislation forcing insurers to accept any willing providers into their net-
works. Or they might establish commissions to monitor provider prices and
perhaps even fix rates.292 Designing institutions that could competently over-
see the sprawling medical marketplace and successfully resist pressure from
289. See Hacker, supra note 18, at 156 (“The importance of the neoclassical critique to
the prevailing intellectual framework of the health policy community helps explain the level of
acceptance that has greeted the managed-competition approach.”).
290. See Jordan Rau, The 10 Most Expensive Insurance Markets in the U.S., Kaiser Health
News (Feb. 3, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/most-expensive-insurance-markets-
obamacare/.
291. See Bodenheimer & Pham, supra note 25, at 802.
292. For an extended, pre-ACA discussion of how cost controls and entry restrictions in
use in other countries could be adapted for the United States, see White, supra note 20, at
271–82.
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the medical industry would be no easy feat.293 But states confronted with
rank unfairness in their health-care markets may come to feel that they have
no real alternative.
Whatever the precise contours of state intervention, public utility regu-
lation today would have one advantage over earlier efforts. Instead of focus-
ing on hospitals and neglecting physicians and alternative care settings,
economic regulation could target the large medical systems that are coming
to dominate the health-care landscape. Not only would that enable eco-
nomic oversight of services offered outside the hospital. Better still, the
states could press those medical systems to adopt pricing models—including
fixed budgets or bundled payments—that would encourage care coordina-
tion and undermine the pernicious incentives of the fee-for-service system.
It’s happened before: in the 1970s, New Jersey’s rate regulators developed
the hospital payment system that Medicare still uses.
Even now, it is possible to discern a renewed interest in public utility
regulation, especially, but not exclusively, at the state level. The adoption of
pricey technology of dubious medical value—including, in particular, pro-
ton-beam accelerators with price tags of $100 million or more294—has
spurred interest in new CON legislation.295 And the impending physician
shortage has rekindled interest in health planning, specifically in efforts to
address perceived inadequacies in the practitioner workforce.296 For now,
workforce planning efforts are largely confined to financial inducements.
The ACA, for example, appropriated $11 billion over five years to support
community health centers and the National Health Service Corps, both of
which aim to make medical care more readily available in under-resourced
areas.297
Access concerns prompted by the exclusion of large hospital systems
from insurer networks have also provoked a response from state policymak-
ers. Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and New Hampshire have all
293. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional De-
sign, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010) (examining the complexities of institutional design and agency
capture).
294. See Jaimy Lee, Proton-Beam Centers Sprout Despite Evidence Drought, Modern
Healthcare, Apr. 14, 2014, at 12, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140412/
MAGAZINE/304129979; Amitabh Chandra et al., Is This Time Different? The Slowdown in
Healthcare Spending, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2013, at 261, 287 fig.8,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/fall-2013/
2013b_chandra_healthcare_spending.pdf.
295. See Tracy Yee et al., Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, Research Brief No.
4, Health Care Certificate-of-Need Laws: Policy or Politics? 1 (2011) (“[T]here is re-
newed interest in certificate-of-need regulation as a way to improve health planning and help
control spending growth.”); Michael D. Rosko & Ryan L. Mutter, The Association of Hospital
Cost-Inefficiency with Certificate-of-Need Regulation, 71 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 280, 280
(2014) (“Results suggest that CON regulation may be an effective policy instrument in an era
of a new medical arms race.”).
296. See John K. Iglehart, A New Day Dawns for Workforce Redesign, 32 Health Aff. 1870
(2013).
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 254b-2(b) (2012).
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given serious consideration to bills that would require insurers to accept any
provider willing to accept their terms into their networks.298 In addition,
some state insurance commissioners have indicated that they will more as-
sertively oversee insurer networks to “make sure when people purchase
health insurance, they have reasonable access to health-care providers,” as
California’s commissioner put it.299 Earlier this year, New York adopted a law
protecting patients from surprise bills if they get treatment from out-of-
network providers when in-network providers are unavailable to treat
them.300 And the Obama administration recently announced that it will co-
operate with state insurance commissioners to craft stringent new rules to
assure the adequacy of provider networks on the exchanges.301
Nascent interest in regulating prices can perhaps be seen in the rapid
proliferation of public databases, all but unknown just a decade ago, that
collect information about the rates that private insurers pay for treatment.
Frustrated at the secrecy shrouding charges that providers negotiate with
insurers,302 sixteen states have moved over the past decade to enact legisla-
tion establishing “all-payer claims databases.”303 The state laws vary along
important dimensions—participation is voluntary in some and mandatory
in others—but they all aim to give policymakers a sense of the prices that
hospitals and other providers actually charge.304 In this, the new databases
are reminiscent of state oversight schemes from the 1970s that allowed state
officials to monitor hospital rates.
298. See Jay Hancock, ‘Narrow Networks’ Trigger Push-Back from State Officials, Kaiser
Health News (Nov. 25, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/states-balk-at-narrow-net
works.
299. Anna Wilde Mathews & Christopher Weaver, Insurers Face New Pressure Over Limited
Doctor Choice, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044
50904579365373011903340; see also Howard, supra note 27, at 592 (“States are . . . stepping up
enforcement of existing network-adequacy requirements and considering new restrictions on
insurers’ networks.”).
300. Anemona Hartocollis, State Curbs Medical Bills Containing Surprises, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 30, 2014, at A19, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/nyregion/new-york-curbs-medical
-bills-containing-surprises.html?_r=0.
301. Robert Pear, To Prevent Surprise Bills, New Health Law Rules Could Widen Insurer
Networks, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2014, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/us/insurers-
face-new-health-law-rules-to-widen-networks-and-prevent-surprise-bills.html.
302. See White et al., supra note 31, at 324.
303. See Patrick Miller & Ashley Peters, All-Payer Claims Database Council,
APCD Legislation: Review of Current Practices and Critical Elements 1 (2013),
https://apcdcouncil.org/sites/apcdcouncil.org/files/APCD%20Council_APCD%20Legislation_
November%202013.pdf.
304. See Denise Love et al., The Commonwealth Fund, All-Payer Claims
Databases: State Initiatives to Improve Health Care Transparency 2 (2010), http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2010/Sep/1439_Love
_allpayer_claims_databases_ib_v2.pdf.
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Most significantly, rate setting has assumed a new prominence in the
policy debates. Leading health economists—including Joseph Newhouse,305
Stuart Altman,306 and David Cutler,307 among others308—have, with varying
degrees of enthusiasm, raised the possibility of shifting to an all-payer ap-
proach to rate regulation. Its most avid proponent, Uwe Reinhardt, believes
the health-care system is at
a clearly delineated crossroads. On one road, Americans would seek better
control over national health spending through an all-payer system, such as
the one operated by Maryland for the hospital sector. On the other road,
Americans would seek better control of health care prices and national
health spending through greater reliance on market forces for most of the
health system. . . . The battle over US health policy in the coming decades
is likely to be over which road to take.309
Interest in rate-setting is not confined to commentators. Maryland, for
example, has recently announced it will strengthen its all-payer system in an
effort to hold cost growth to roughly the rate of economic growth over the
next five years.310 Because the Maryland system has done much to limit costs
per admission but little to reduce the number of admissions per patient,311
305. Joseph P. Newhouse, Analysis and Commentary, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on
Four Key Groups of Americans, 29 Health Aff. 1714, 1723 (2010) (“Despite all of the substan-
tive and political problems of price setting, some sort of all-payer regulatory regime may be
the only feasible alternative.”).
306. Financing Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Stuart H. Altman), http://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stuart%20Altman.pdf (“I would recommend that the
federal government encourage more states to establish all-payer systems . . . .”).
307. See Cutler & Morton, supra note 45, at 1969 (“A third approach, if there is no other
way to obtain good care except through monopoly organizations, is for policy makers to regu-
late prices or total spending.”).
308. See, e.g., Anna S. Sommers et al., Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, Policy
Analysis No. 9, Addressing Hospital Pricing Leverage Through Regulation: State
Rate Setting (2012), http://www.nihcr.org/1tl92; Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated
System of Provider Payments in the United States, 37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 679 (2012);
Joseph White, Cost Control and Health Care Reform: The Case for All-Payer Regulation (May
12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), www.ourfuture.org/files/JWhiteAllPayerCostControl.pdf/
; Paul B. Ginsburg, All-Payer Rate Setting: A Response to a ‘Modest Proposal’ from Uwe Rein-
hardt, Health Aff. Blog (July 24, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/all-payer-
rate-setting-a-response-to-a-modest-proposal-from-uwe-reinhardt/; Jonathan Skinner et al.,
The 125 Percent Solution: Fixing Variations in Health Care Prices, Health Aff. Blog (Aug. 26,
2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/26/the-125-percent-solution-fixing-variations-in-
health-care-prices/.
309. Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 2129 (citing Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to
Control Costs and Boost Quality: The Maryland Experience, 28 Health Aff. 1395, 1399
(2009)).
310. See Maryland All-Payer Model, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://
innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-Model/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
311. See Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost Quality: The
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104 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:57
the state’s new plan will establish fixed budgets for hospital systems keyed to
the overall patient population.312 Those fixed budgets will put pressure on
the systems to reduce not only the costs of care, but also the amount of care
they provide. In this, the Maryland plan resembles New York’s first efforts at
rate-setting in the 1970s.313 As the federal government explained in an-
nouncing a partnership with the state, “the Maryland system may serve as a
model for other states interested in developing all-payer payment
systems.”314
The trend toward a greater acceptance of the public utility model is no-
where more apparent than in Massachusetts. Because the state addressed the
insurance crisis in 2006—four years before the ACA was enacted—it has
had longer to attend to other weaknesses in the private health-care system.
In a series of enactments culminating in the 2012 adoption of the most
ambitious cost-control legislation in the country, Massachusetts has edged
much closer than is commonly appreciated toward treating medicine as a
public utility.
For starters, the state has put health planning at the center of its new
approach. The 2012 law establishes a “health planning council” to catalog
“the location, distribution and nature of all health care resources in the
commonwealth” and develop “recommendations for the appropriate supply
and distribution” of those resources.315 The goal of the health plan is “to
rationally distribute health care resources across geographic regions of [the]
state based on the needs of the population on a statewide basis, as well as,
the needs of particular geographic areas of the state.”316
Massachusetts has also taken steps to more closely monitor provider
charges. The state established an all-payer claims database in 2008317 and in
2012 expanded the database to require a wider range of data from a broader
set of providers about their organizational structure and finances.318 In addi-
tion, the 2012 legislation created a new entity—the Health Policy Commis-
sion—and invested it with authority to oversee state spending targets.319
Should the state fail to meet its target in a given year, the commission can
review the business practices of any provider with excessive expenditures.320
Even more significantly, each provider in the state must inform the commis-
sion before making any meaningful changes in its operations or governance
312. See Md. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Maryland’s All-Payer Model:
Proposal to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 12 (2013), http://
dhmh.maryland.gov/docs/Final%20Combined%20Waiver%20Package%20101113.pdf.
313. See supra notes 268–271 and accompanying text.
314. Maryland All-Payer Model, supra note 310.
315. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6A, § 16T(a)–(b) (2012).
316. Id. § 16(b).
317. See Act of Aug. 1, 2008, ch. 305, sec. 3, § 16K(a), 2008 Mass. Acts 1322, 1322–23
(2008) (repealed 2012).
318. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12C, §§ 9, 10(b) (2012).
319. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6D (2012).
320. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11N (2012).
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structure.321 If the commission concludes that a change will impair the
state’s ability to meet its spending target, it can undertake a “cost and mar-
ket impact review” and, where necessary, refer the provider to the state at-
torney general for an investigation into potential antitrust violations.322
Recent experience suggests that the commission is no paper tiger. Last
year, it rebuked Partners HealthCare, Massachusetts’s largest hospital sys-
tem, over its proposed acquisition of a hospital system and physician net-
work.323 Believing that the acquisitions would increase the hospital system’s
market power, the commission referred Partners to the attorney general for
possible action.324 In mid-May, the attorney general announced that she had
entered into an agreement with Partners that would allow it to proceed with
its acquisitions. In exchange, Partners agreed to rudimentary price controls:
it promised (among other things) not to raise costs above the rate of infla-
tion for the next six years.325
Massachusetts has thus made a considered effort to oversee supply, to
reduce discriminatory pricing, and to control costs. In this, Massachusetts’s
efforts bear the imprint of public utility regulation. By no means has the
state unequivocally endorsed the public utility model for regulating
medicine: the new legislation is in many respects tentative, particularly when
it comes to the enforcement of statewide spending targets. But Massachu-
setts may be a leading indicator of a broader trend.
Conclusion
In 1980, the Institute of Medicine published a report titled Health Plan-
ning in the United States.326 Prepared in the heat of a transformational presi-
dential election by a committee of nationally renowned experts, the report’s
fervent embrace of health planning reflected the then-prevailing consensus
that such planning was, and would continue to be, central to the develop-
ment of the health-care market.
The only discordant note came from committee member Clark Havig-
hurst, an early and avid proponent of the turn to market-oriented strategies
in health care. Havighurst offered a separate statement that amounted to a
dissent: “My own preference is for restoring competition to a dominant re-
source-allocation role. The committee acknowledges the existence of this
321. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6D, §13(a) (2012).
322. Id. § 13(a), (h).
323. See Health Policy Comm’n, Review of Partners HealthCare System’s Pro-
posed Acquisitions of South Shore Hospital and Harbor Medical Associates: Final
Report (2014), http://www.mass.gov/anf/docs/hpc/20140219-final-cmir-report-phs-ssh-hmc
.pdf.
324. See id. at 59.
325. See Martha Bebinger, AG Inks Deal to Rein in Partners HealthCare, but Does It Go Far
Enough?, WBUR’s CommonHealth (May 19, 2014), http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2014/05/
partners-south-shore-ag-deal.
326. Inst. of Med., supra note 186.
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point of view but minimizes its realism. Nevertheless, it is an idea whose
time may well be coming . . . .”327
Havighurst proved prescient. Yet, thirty-four years after Havighurst
penned his dissent, public utility is now the idea whose time may be coming
(back). In so arguing, I do not mean to minimize how hard it would be to
regulate medicine as a utility. Nor do I discount the risks of such an ap-
proach. But the familiar objections to public utility regulation—its suscepti-
bility to domination by powerful interests, its inefficiency, the intrinsic
difficulty supervising a complex market—may come to seem, in time, less
like reasons to dismiss it than as challenges to be managed. If so, the urgent
question won’t be whether to treat medicine as a utility. It will be how to
assure that the agencies charged with overseeing the medical marketplace
have the authority, expertise, and independence to do their jobs.
I could of course be wrong about all of this. Maybe the pendulum is not
swinging back; maybe the ACA’s market-oriented approach will prove both
workable and durable. Whatever happens, however, the public debate re-
mains much too dismissive of a mode of regulation, deeply rooted in the
American tradition, that has long been used to tame the unruly market for
health care.
327. Id. at A3 (statement of Clark C. Havighurst).
